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This paper investigates the spread of aggressive corporate tax reporting by modeling a 
firm’s decision to adopt the corporate-owned life insurance (COLI) shelter.  I use a sample of 
known COLI participants to examine whether certain firm characteristics are associated with the 
decision to adopt a COLI shelter.  I find some evidence that firms with higher performance-
matched discretionary accruals are more likely to adopt a COLI shelter, suggesting a positive 
relation between aggressive financial reporting and aggressive tax reporting.  I also find that firms 
with greater capital market visibility are less likely to adopt a COLI shelter, consistent with a 
potential reputational cost for being associated with aggressive tax avoidance activities. Further, 
my results suggest that COLI adopters are generally R&D intensive firms with low leverage and 
few foreign operations.  In addition to firm specific characteristics, I consider two explanations 
for the spread of COLI adoption motivated by theory on diffusion of innovations and institutional 
isomorphism.  I investigate whether firms imitate prior COLI adopters and whether COLI 
adoption spreads through common auditors.  My results are not consistent with an imitation 
 vii
explanation.  Further, my results suggest that having the same auditor as a prior COLI adopter 
does not increase the likelihood that a firm will adopt COLI. 
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Introduction 
During the 1990s aggressive financial reporting escalated, exemplified by the Enron and 
Worldcom scandals.  At the same time, the corporate tax shelter industry boomed, suggesting an 
epidemic of aggressive corporate reporting.  Increases in aggressive tax reporting drew coverage 
from the financial press and a full-scale crackdown by the Treasury.  In 1998, Forbes magazine 
described a new breed of tax shelters in its cover story, “The Hustling of X-Rated Shelters” 
(Novack and Saunders).  The following year, the Treasury (1999) released a 164-page report 
urging the adoption of numerous legislative measures to curb the growing tax shelter problem.  
However, to date we have little evidence on the determinants of tax shelter participation at the 
firm level.  In this study, I investigate aggressive corporate tax reporting by examining firms 
investing in a specific tax shelter: corporate-owned life insurance (COLI).1  In Part I of this 
study, I examine the firm-specific factors associated with aggressive tax reporting and test 
whether firms’ financial reporting incentives, alternative tax savings opportunities, and 
reputational concerns affect the decision to adopt a tax shelter.  In Part II of this study, I explore 
whether theories on diffusion and institutional isomorphism help explain the spread of tax shelter 
adoption among firms. 
Treasury (1999) is concerned about the proliferation of tax shelter use not only because 
of its impact on revenue losses, but also because corporate tax shelters breed disrespect and 
threaten the voluntary tax system.  Fairness, important in a voluntary tax system, is undermined 
when taxpayers see that large corporations and wealthy individuals are able to get away with 
sheltering significant amounts of income.  Bankman (2004a) even suggests that the role played in 
the tax shelter industry by large accounting firms, already tarnished by their involvement in 
 
1 I describe the development of the corporate-owned life insurance shelter in Chapter 1, Section 2.  Unless 
otherwise indicated by context, throughout the paper, I use the term “COLI” to refer specifically to the 
COLI shelter, not corporate-owned life insurance in general.  
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financial accounting scandals, could further anger taxpayers and lead to widespread 
noncompliance in the more general form of overstated deductions, understated income, and 
nonfiling.   
The tax shelter industry also distorts allocation of economic resources.  Tax shelter 
activity diverts resources away from the government toward accountants, lawyers and others who 
develop and promote tax shelters.  Moreover, according to theories of corporate tax incidence, 
engaging in a tax shelter cannot make a corporation, per se, better off.  The benefits from 
reducing the corporation’s tax bill will ultimately accrue to its shareholders through higher stock 
prices, its employees through higher wages, or its customers through lower prices.  Exactly how 
the benefits will be shared is unknown, but Slemrod (2004) conjectures that the benefits of 
engaging in aggressive tax shelters will primarily accrue to shareholders who may share some 
with executives through incentive compensation arrangements.  If so, tax shelters function 
primarily to shift resources away from the government’s general citizenry and toward corporate 
investors and managers.  Finally, to the extent firms in a particular industry have more 
opportunities to engage in sheltering taxable income, tax shelters may unduly shift the corporate 
tax burden from one sector of the economy to another. 
Congress and the Treasury have primarily focused on the supply side of the tax shelter 
industry.  In 2002, the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations launched an in-
depth inquiry into the role of accountants, lawyers and financial professionals in the U.S. tax 
shelter industry with a spotlight on the public accounting firm KPMG LLP.  The 2004 American 
Jobs Creation Act (AJCA) enacted new rules requiring tax shelter promoters to file returns 
disclosing reportable transactions and to maintain investor lists.  The supply side of the tax shelter 
industry is arguably easier to uncover and investigate.  However, regulators charged with curbing 
aggressive corporate tax reporting need to understand the underlying nature of the demand for 
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corporate tax shelters as well.  This paper attempts to shed light on the demand side of the tax 
shelter industry by examining firms’ decisions to adopt the COLI tax shelter. 
Tax shelters can be viewed as investments whose returns are generated by tax benefits.  
Treasury’s report (1999) cites the pressure to keep the firm’s effective tax rate (ETR) low and in 
line with competitor benchmarks and increase shareholder value as the driving force behind the 
recent wave of corporate tax shelters.  To better understand aggressive corporate tax reporting 
and the latest tax shelter boom, I investigate firms involved in the COLI tax shelter.  I examine 
firm-specific factors associated with the likelihood that a firm initially adopts COLI.  I also 
investigate the spread of COLI activity and test whether the firm’s social environment affects its 
decision to adopt the COLI shelter. 
The primary contribution of this study is the use of actual tax shelter participants to 
model firms’ decisions to engage in aggressive tax reporting.  Aggressive corporate tax reporting 
is both difficult to define conceptually and difficult to measure.2  Most prior studies of aggressive 
corporate tax reporting use ETRs or the difference between reported financial and taxable income 
(book-tax differences) to proxy for tax avoidance (e.g. Rego 2003; Desai and Dharmapala 2006; 
Frank et al. 2006).3  However, ETRs and book-tax differences are noisy measures of aggressive 
tax reporting.  ETRs vary with profitability, industry differences in the reporting of revenue and 
expenses, and legitimate tax planning opportunities.  Consequently, it is difficult to distinguish 
lower ETRs due to better tax planning from those due to aggressive avoidance or shelter activity.  
Treasury’s (1999) report suggests that the growing gap between financial statement income and 
 
2 Many studies rely on Bankman’s (2004a) working definition of a tax shelter as a  “(1) tax motivated; (2) 
transaction unrelated to a taxpayer’s normal business operations; that (3) under a literal reading of some 
relevant legal authority; (4) produces a loss for tax purposes in excess of any economic loss; (5) in a 
manner inconsistent with legislative intent or purpose.”  See also Bankman (1999). 
3 Graham and Tucker (2006) identify known tax shelter participants.  However, their study focuses on 
firms’ debt policy decisions, not firms’ decisions to engage in aggressive tax reporting. 
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taxable income is evidence of increased corporate tax shelter activity, but Manzon and Plesko 
(2002) are unable to confirm the link between the increase in book-tax differences and the 
reported increase in shelter activity.  Given Manzon and Plesko’s (2002) findings, Shevlin (2002) 
specifically calls for the study of known tax shelter users to gain a better understanding of 
corporate tax aggressiveness. 
By nature, tax shelters are secretive, so developing a sample of known tax shelter users is 
not a trivial endeavor.  McGill and Outslay (2004) suggest the analysis of firms’ tax footnote rate 
reconciliations as a one way to uncover tax shelter users.  The rate reconciliation details 
permanent book-tax differences.  Shelters that produce permanent differences not only lower the 
firm’s tax liability, they also lower the firm’s ETR, which increases earnings per share.  I search 
through firms’ financial statement disclosures, their tax rate reconciliations and tax footnotes, to 
develop a sample of COLI shelter participants.  Thus, the main advantage of this study is that I 
avoid problems associated with estimating aggressive tax reporting behavior by identifying actual 
tax shelter participants. 
In Part I of this study, I use matched control samples to estimate a model of the cross-
sectional firm characteristics associated with tax shelter adoption.  I find that performance-
matched discretionary accruals are positively related to the likelihood of adopting a COLI shelter, 
suggesting a link between aggressive financial reporting and aggressive tax reporting.  I also find 
that firms with greater capital market visibility are less likely to adopt a COLI shelter, and 
interpret this as evidence that managers perceive a reputational cost for being associated with 
aggressive tax avoidance.   
In Part II of this study, I discuss how theory on the diffusion of strategic innovations and 
institutional isomorphism might help explain the proliferation of corporate tax shelter activity.  
Drawing on these theories, I develop two hypotheses regarding the spread of COLI use and test 
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these hypotheses using both a cross-sectional regression and a discrete-time hazard model.  I find 
that neither the prevalence of COLI activity in a firm’s industry nor direct connections to prior 
shelter adopters via auditors increases the probability of adopting the shelter.  I also extend the 
hypotheses developed in Part I and investigate whether the same firm characteristics hypothesized 
to influence the firm’s decision to adopt a COLI shelter also influence how quickly a firm adopts 
a COLI shelter.  I present results from two event history models, a standard Cox proportional 
hazard model and a split population model, and argue that since the number of eventual COLI 
adopters is a small percentage of the overall sample the split population model is more 
appropriate.  Results from the split population model suggest that early COLI adopters are larger 
firms with less extensive foreign operations. 
This paper is organized into two parts and ten chapters.  The first five chapters comprise 
Part I and cover background information generally, as well as the relevant prior literature, 
hypothesis development, research methodology and results related to my first research agenda.  
The second five chapters comprise Part II and cover the background literature, hypothesis 





Chapter 1 - Background on Corporate Tax Shelters  
1.1 Recent Tax Shelter Industry Boom 
 Although the 1990’s witnessed a boom in the tax shelter industry, tax shelters are not a 
new phenomenon.  For example, Eustice (2002) traces modern lease-stripping transactions back 
to the leveraged drilling fund shelters of the 1970s, and even further back to the 1958 P.G. Lake 
decision which spawned the widespread use of income carve-outs by oil companies.4  As 
regulators shut down one form of income-accelerating transaction, another arose.  Bankman 
(1999) distinguishes recent tax shelters from those shelters designed for high-income individuals 
and targeted by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, stating “the new corporate tax shelter is much more 
sophisticated and complex that its 1980s predecessor.”  Whether the 1990’s saw an old problem 
rising up again or a distinctly new and different problem, the proliferation of tax shelters 
throughout the decade caught the attention of media and regulators, bringing the tax shelter 
debate into the forefront once again. 
 A precise estimate of the size of the tax shelter industry does not exist.  In March 2000, 
the Joint Committee on Taxation concluded that there was a widespread and significant corporate 
tax shelter problem, even though it admitted, “the data are not sufficiently refined to provide a 
reliable measure of corporate tax shelter activity.”5  Bankman (1999) initially estimated that tax 
shelters could cost the Treasury up to $10 billion a year.  Former IRS Commissioner Charles 
                                                 
4 Commissioner vs. P.G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260 (1958) 
5 Joint Committee on Taxation, “Testimony of the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation Concerning 
Interest and Penalties and Corporate Tax Shelters Before the Senate Finance Committee,” JCX-23-00, 
March 7, 2000. 
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Rossotti (2002) reported that the IRS’s amnesty program yielded $30 billion in voluntarily 
disclosed shelter-related deductions. 
The extent of the tax shelter market is difficult to quantify because, among other issues, 
there is no precise definition for a tax shelter.  Distinguishing between legitimate tax avoidance 
strategies and transactions that cross the line is a challenge faced by accounting researchers, legal 
scholars, regulators and perhaps even taxpayers themselves.  Many scholars have referenced 
Bankman (2004a) who defines a tax shelter as a “(1) tax motivated; (2) transaction unrelated to a 
taxpayer’s normal business operations; that (3) under a literal reading of some relevant legal 
authority; (4) produces a loss for tax purposes in excess of any economic loss; (5) in a manner 
inconsistent with legislative intent or purpose.”  Bankman’s (2004a) definition highlights some of 
the defining characteristics of recent corporate tax shelters. 
Treasury (1999) also outlined what it believed were common corporate tax shelter 
characteristics: (1) lack of economic substance, (2) inconsistent financial accounting and tax 
treatments, (3) presence of tax-indifferent parties, (4) complexity, (5) unnecessary steps or novel 
investments, (6) promotion or marketing, (7) confidentiality, (8) high transaction costs and (9) 
contingent or refundable fees and rescission or insurance arrangements.  The focus of this paper, 
corporate-owned life insurance, is a classic example of this new breed of corporate tax shelters, as 
shown in the following section which describes its development. 
 
1.2 Background on Corporate Owned Life Insurance (COLI) 
1.2.1 A Tax Arbitrage Opportunity 
The COLI shelter can be described best as a tax arbitrage transaction, similar to the 
classic municipal bond arbitrage strategy.  In the muni-bond arbitrage strategy, a taxpayer 
borrows funds to purchase municipal bonds.  The municipal bonds produce tax-exempt interest 
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income.  Meanwhile, the loan gives rise to tax-deductible interest expense.  The arbitrage profit is 
the difference between the after-tax interest rate on the loan and the tax-exempt interest rate on 
the municipal bonds.6
Like municipal bonds, life insurance policies receive preferential treatment under the 
Internal Revenue Code (IRC).  Among other preferences, since 1913, life insurance proceeds paid 
upon the death of the insured party have been excluded from the beneficiary’s gross income (IRC 
§101(a)).  As in the muni-bond example, the preferential treatment of life insurance proceeds 
provides an opportunity for tax arbitrage in which the taxpayer finances the purchase of an asset 
which produces tax-exempt income, a life insurance policy, using proceeds from a loan that 
produces tax-deductible interest expense.   
There are several different forms of life insurance.  To fully describe life insurance-
related tax arbitrage, it is important to distinguish between two main types of life insurance 
policies: pure insurance protection policies and cash value insurance policies.  Pure insurance 
protection policies, traditionally referred to as term life policies, include only a death benefit.  The 
purchaser of a term life policy pays premiums over time, and the insurance company commits to 
pay a specified sum to a beneficiary if the insured individual dies during term of the policy.  
Premiums for pure protection are calculated using actuarial tables.  Cash value life insurance 
policies, including whole life, universal life, variable life, and variable universal life, are more 
complicated.  In addition to the pure insurance protection of a death benefit, cash value life 
insurance policies include a savings component.  
As the name indicates, a cash value life insurance contract has a cash surrender value that 
the policyholder is entitled to receive if the contract is terminated.  The premium paid on a cash 
 
6 To deter this type of arbitrage, IRC §256 disallows the deduction of interest on loans used to purchase 
certain assets that yield tax-exempt income. 
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value policy includes: (1) a charge covering the insurance company’s cost to provide pure 
insurance protection, and (2) an amount credited to the policy’s cash surrender value.  Over time, 
the cash value of a policy builds in two ways: (1) as premiums, in excess of the cost for pure 
insurance protection, are paid, and (2) as interest is credited to the life insurance policy.  For 
example, consider a simplified cash value policy with a death benefit of $100,000 and an annual 
premium of $1,300.  Suppose the cost of the current year’s insurance protection is $200.  If the 
remaining $1,100 earns interest at a rate of four percent, the policy would have a $1,144 cash 
value at the end of the year.  The $44 of interest is commonly called the “inside interest build-
up.” 
As mentioned before, under IRC §101, the proceeds paid out to a beneficiary upon the 
death of an insured are excluded from the beneficiary’s taxable income.  This favorable treatment 
is provided for death benefits associated with cash value life policies as well as term life policies.  
In addition, the investment income, or interest, earned on a cash value life insurance policy is also 
accorded preferential tax treatment.  Unlike other interest income which is taxed as earned, no 
portion of the interest credited to the cash value of a policy (the inside buildup) is included in the 
policyholder’s gross income (IRC §72).  Distributions of the cash value made prior to the death of 
the insured are generally includible in income; nonetheless, cash value life insurance policies 
have a significant tax-deferral benefit.7  Moreover, a taxpayer can access the cash value of his 
policy while still preserving the deferral benefit by borrowing against the policy because loans 
secured by life insurance contracts are not treated as taxable distributions (IRC §72). 
In the 1950’s insurance companies began to market leveraged insurance transactions, 
designed to take advantage of the income deferral on inside buildup and the ability to borrow 
 
7 Distributions of the cash surrender value are generally treated first as a tax-free recovery of basis, and 
only result in includible income when the amounts distributed exceed the taxpayer’s investment or basis in 
the policy (IRC §72(e)). 
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against cash value policies without triggering taxable distributions.  In a leveraged insurance 
transaction, the policyholder (1) pays large premiums to create the policy’s cash value quickly, 
(2) strips out the investment’s cash by borrowing against the policy’s cash value, and (3) pays 
tax-deductible interest back to the insurance company.  The insurance company, in turn, credits 
the policy’s inside build-up with investment earnings which are tax-deferred to the policyholder.  
The insurance company makes a profit on the difference between the interest rate on the policy 
loan and the policy’s crediting rate.  The policyholder makes a tax arbitrage profit because the 
tax-deferred interest credited to the policy’s cash value is greater than the after-tax cost of 
deductible interest payments on policy loans.  Over time, Congress has limited, but not 
eliminated, the tax arbitrage opportunity created by leveraged cash value insurance transactions.8  
 
1.2.2 Development of the COLI Shelter 
Businesses have used COLI for decades.  Under a COLI program, the employee is the 
insured party, but the company owns the policy, pays the premiums and is the beneficiary.  One 
of the most widely recognized forms of COLI is “key-man” life insurance.  Companies have a 
legitimate business purpose for purchasing “key-man” policies, as these policies insure against 
the financial cost of losing key employees to unexpected death, including the cost of recruiting 
appropriately experienced replacements and the cost of redeeming the equity stake of key 
employees upon their deaths.  Over time, however, companies began to take out more and more 
insurance on their executives, maximizing the tax arbitrage opportunity available by borrowing 
against the policies and enjoying deductible interest payments while the cash value of the policies 
built-up tax-free.  
                                                 
8 Using highly technical bright-line tests, IRC §§7702 and 7702A deny the preferential tax treatment 
generally accorded to inside build-up and policy loans when transactions are overly-investment oriented.    
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In the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86), Congress enacted two important changes in an 
attempt to control COLI arbitrage opportunities: (1) limiting interest deductions on COLI 
borrowings to $50,000 per insured life and (2) changing the criteria defining modified 
endowment contracts, effectively capping the premiums that could be charged for COLI policies.  
These restrictions, and their predecessors, follow a pattern of attempting to limit tax arbitrage by 
narrowing the statutory definition of life insurance.  For example, IRC §7702 specifically defines 
life insurance for tax purposes as a contract that meets one of two actuarial tests, the cash value 
accumulation test or the guideline premium/cash value corridor test.  IRC §7702A further denies 
preferential treatment to “modified endowment contracts,” which it defines as those life insurance 
contracts that fail to meet the “seven-pay-test,” a comparison of the contract’s premium schedule 
during the first seven years with a hypothetical contract with the same death benefit.  Rather than 
eliminating the preferential treatment for life insurance, which gives rise to the tax arbitrage 
opportunity, Congress attempted to limit the extent of arbitrage by enacting a series of highly 
complex bright-line rules.   
TRA86 added two more bright-line restrictions, but rather than abandon the market for 
tax arbitrage, insurance industry entrepreneurs responded by offering a new product: broad-based, 
leveraged COLI.  Broad-based, leveraged COLI was designed to work around each of the TRA86 
restrictions and provide greater tax arbitrage savings than ever before.  The new COLI product 
used volume to make up for the arbitrage opportunity denied by the $50,000 per insured policy 
loan cap.  Instead of covering just key executives, the COLI shelter was designed to cover 
thousands of a company’s rank and file employees.9  To provide context for the magnitude of the 
 
9 The media has referred to COLI as “janitor’s insurance” and “dead peasant policies,” exacerbating the 
public’s misconception that companies using COLI benefit from the death of their employees.  Originally, 
these policies were designed to be mortality neutral.  Nonetheless, companies have been criticized for 
failing to adequately inform employees of their role as insured persons in COLI programs.    
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new COLI arrangements, court documents reveal that Winn-Dixie, a supermarket chain, covered 
nearly all 36,000 of its employees while Wal-Mart allegedly covered 350,000 of its employees 
(Winn-Dixie Stores v. C.I.R, 113 T.C. 54 (1999); Rice v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 12 F. Supp. 2d 
1207). 
The COLI shelter was implemented using sophisticated computer programs to maximize 
the $50,000 per insured deduction while ensuring that each individual policy did not exceed 
allowable life insurance limits.  COLI promoters also used leveraged financing arrangements to 
minimize the cash outlay required to invest in the shelter and allow COLI investors to deduct 
interest on policy-loans.10  The new COLI programs were designed to produce millions of 
dollars in tax savings over several years.  For example, court documents indicate that initial 
estimates for the plan purchased by Winn-Dixie projected that COLI could produce after-tax 
savings of approximately $2.7 billion, at a before-tax cost of $700 million, over sixty years.  
However, while the post-1986 COLI shelter was still relatively new it came under attack by 
Congress and the IRS. 
By 1990, Congress was aware that corporations were using broad-based leveraged COLI, 
and in 1996 Congress enacted new restrictions, limiting a corporation’s interest deductions 
directly traceable to COLI to $50,000 per insured for a maximum of 20 individuals (Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 1996).  The IRS also began challenging pre-1996 
COLI programs, successfully litigating three cases involving broad-based leveraged COLI 
 
10IRC §264 generally disallows interest deductions on amounts systematically borrowed against insurance 
policies to pay premiums.  However, policy loan deductions are allowed if premiums are paid using debt in 
only three of the first seven years of a given plan.  Financing was arranged to meet the “four out of seven” 
safe harbor. 
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transactions (Winn-Dixie, C.M. Holdings, and AEP).11  In each case, the court denied the 
claimed interest deductions on the grounds that broad-based, leveraged COLI lacked economic 
substance and constituted a sham transaction. 
In 2000, the IRS reported that it had identified 85 cases of COLI and was investigating 50 
more cases, and in August of 2001, the IRS implemented a coordinated settlement initiative for 
COLI cases.  This amnesty initiative generally permitted taxpayers to settle any liability related to 
COLI activity by conceding 80% of their COLI-related interest deductions.  In October 2002, 
after its success in litigating COLI transactions, the IRS decided to terminate its amnesty 
initiative, giving taxpayers until November 18, 2002 to make settlement offers under the 
agreement.  The government’s victories in court effectively shut down the COLI shelter, forcing 
COLI participants to unwind their investments.   
Broad-based, leveraged COLI programs are a good setting to study aggressive corporate 
tax reporting.  For researchers, defining exactly what constitutes aggressive corporate tax 
reporting is a challenging task.  Where should we draw the line between less aggressive behavior 
and more aggressive behavior?  Even legal scholars cannot agree on a threshold.  The advantage 
of this study is that I do not have to define this threshold.  I measure aggressive tax reporting as 
participation in broad-based leveraged COLI, which the IRS and courts have already determined 
crosses the line of acceptable tax reporting behavior. 
Although those who developed the COLI strategy structured the transaction to meet the 
“letter of the law”, COLI plans fit several of the generally accepted characteristics of a tax 
 
11 Winn-Dixie Stores v. C.I.R., 113 T.C. 54 (1999), aff’d, 254 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2001); in re C.M. 
Holdings, Inc., 254 B.R. 578 (Bankr D. Del. 2000), aff’d, 301 F.3d 96 (3d Cir. 2002); AEP, Inc. v. United 
States, 136 F.Supp. 2d 762 (S.D. Ohio 2001), aff’d, 326 F.3d 737 (6th Cir. 2003) 
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shelter.12  COLI transactions have at least three of the common indicia for defining tax shelters: 
lack of business purpose, lack of profit potential apart from the tax benefits, and the prepackaged, 
predetermined nature of the transaction (Eustice 2002).13  Furthermore, given the co-evolution of 
life insurance products and increasing restrictions on the tax arbitrage opportunities related to life 
insurance, broad-based, leveraged COLI is clearly inconsistent with the intent of the tax law.  
Detailed court documents reveal that prior to Camelot’s final decision to invest in COLI, the 
company’s chief financial officer was concerned about impact of possible adverse tax legislation 
and wanted special provisions included in the purchase agreements allowing Camelot to rescind 
its purchase if tax restrictions were enacted in 1990.14   
Changes to the law, IRS court victories and the IRS’s COLI amnesty/settlement program 
have brought COLI investors out of hiding.  Thus, COLI represents a chance to identify and study 
firms that invest in tax shelters, both those that were caught and those that voluntarily came 
forward. 
  
1.3 Accounting Treatment of COLI15
 Investments in life insurance are governed by FASB Technical Bulletin No. 85-4 which 
prescribes the use of the cash surrender value (CSV) method.  Under the CSV method, a firm 
                                                 
12 Bankman (2004a), Eustice (2002), Gergen (2002), Novack and Saunders (1998) 
13 While most would not challenge the business purpose of purchasing life insurance on key executives, 
defending the business purpose of broad-based leveraged COLI is more difficult.  BOLI (bank-owned life 
insurance) which has flourished since the 1996 HIPAA act is marketed as a way for banks to fund their 
employee benefits.  However, Edwards (2005) finds no correlation between the level of banks’ employee 
benefits and BOLI investments. 
14 See in re C.M. Holdings, Inc., 254 B.R. 578 (Bankr D. Del. 2000). 
15 Material for this section is drawn from Nurnberg (2004). 
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should record the CSV of the life insurance policy as an asset.  Under the right of setoff, firms 
can net outstanding policy loans against the CSV of the policy, rather than record a separate 
liability (APB No. 10, FASB Technical Bulletin No. 88-2 and FASB Interpretation No. 39).  
Since COLI shelters produce tax savings by maximizing borrowings against the CSV of the 
insurance policies, firms can participate in COLI shelters with little net effect on their balance 
sheets.   
 On the income statement, COLI expense (income) equals the premium paid less the 
increase in the CSV for the period (FASB Technical Bulletin No. 85-4).  In practice, net life 
insurance expense (income) equals premiums paid plus interest on policy loans less increases in 
the CSV of the policy less death benefits received.  Figure 1 provides a detailed example of the 
income statement impact of COLI. 
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 109, Accounting for Income 
Taxes, requires firms to disclose a reconciliation of their ETR and the statutory tax rate, and any 
material permanent book-tax difference must be reported as a separate item.  SFAS No. 109 also 
indicates that the excess of CSV over premiums paid results in a permanent book-tax difference if 
the insurance policy is expected to be held until the death of the insured.  Therefore, the excess of 
taxable deductions over non-taxable income generated from participating in a COLI program, if 
material, should be reported in the rate reconciliation.  As an example, the tax footnote rate 
reconciliation in Sonoco’s 1994 10-K shows COLI-related tax benefits of $5.09 million.  
However, firms have considerable discretion over how permanent differences are netted and 
aggregated into specific line items on the rate reconciliation. 
Tax shelter activity is difficult to detect in the financial statements (McGill and Outslay 
2004).  COLI, like other shelters of the 1990’s, is characterized by its ability to create tax savings 
without substantially impacting the firm’s balance sheet accounts.  Because increases in CSV, 
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death benefits, premium expense and interest expense on policy loans are netted together, pre-tax 
net COLI income (expense) is likely small.  Moreover, the net effect itself is usually buried in 
SG&A.  Likewise, net COLI investment, if different from zero, is often buried in “Other Assets” 
on the balance sheet.16  The level of detail, if any, disclosed in the financial statement footnotes 
regarding COLI plans varies considerably from firm to firm.  
 
16 Court documents reveal that Camelot’s COLI plan was set to maintain a zero net equity balance at the 
end of each year (in re C.M. Holdings, Inc., 254 B.R. 578 (Bankr D. Del. 2000). 
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Chapter 2 - Literature Review 
This study is an investigation of the firm characteristics associated with aggressive 
corporate tax reporting, which I capture using a sample of tax shelter participants.  Although there 
is scant research on the demand for tax shelters per se, this study fits broadly into the body of 
literature on tax avoidance.  Tax avoidance can be thought of as spectrum of strategies, with 
clearly legitimate tax planning ideas on one end and egregious tax evasion on the other end.  In 
other words, not all tax avoidance strategies are tax shelters.  However, within reason, much of 
what is known about tax avoidance in general can be helpful in explaining COLI tax shelter use 
specifically.  In the following sections, I review several papers that exemplify extant literature on 
tax avoidance.  Some of these studies are directly related to the development of my hypotheses.  I 
review others to provide perspective on the research questions that have been addressed in prior 
literature and demonstrate the incremental contribution of my study.  
 
2.1 Analytical Models of Tax Evasion 
 Early studies focus on an individual’s decision to evade taxes, rather than corporate tax 
avoidance.  Allingham and Sandmo’s (1972) seminal paper frames tax evasion as a purely 
economic decision under uncertainty.  A rational taxpayer must allocate his income between a 
riskless asset (reported income) and a risky asset (evasion), where the payoff to the risky asset 
depends on the probability of getting caught and the size of the penalty assessed if caught, both 
exogenously given.  Allingham and Sandmo (1972) show analytically that given a risk-averse 
taxpayer, evasion decreases as both the probability of detection and the penalty increase.  The 
stream of research that follows Allingham and Sandmo’s (1972) initial framework focuses on 
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how uncertainty regarding the probability of detection, the penalty structure, the tax rate, and the 
tax liability, impact the individual taxpayer’s decision to evade.17   
While this early body of research provides insights on individual tax evasion, a different 
conceptual framework is needed to understand aggressive tax reporting by large, publicly-held 
corporations (Slemrod 2004).  Unlike risk-averse individuals, corporate shareholders have 
diversified portfolios and should therefore be relatively risk-neutral.  While shareholders are 
theoretically risk-neutral, corporate tax evasion involves the coordination of multiple players, 
including the shareholders’ potentially risk-averse agent, the chief financial officer.  Agency 
issues play an important role in thinking about corporate tax avoidance.  Below, I discuss two 
recent theoretical studies each of which strives to develop a new analytic framework more 
appropriate for studying corporate tax evasion. 
 Crocker and Slemrod (2004) model corporate tax evasion in an agency context in which 
the chief financial officer (CFO), who is contracted to manage the firm’s tax liability, is assumed 
to possess private information regarding the extent of legally permissible reductions in taxable 
income and may also engage in illegal evasion. Crocker and Slemrod (2004) characterize the 
optimal incentive contract for the CFO and show that penalties imposed on the CFO directly are 
more effective at reducing evasion than those imposed on shareholders.  While their model is an 
important first step in developing a theoretical framework for understanding corporate tax evasion 
and produces results of interest to regulators attempting to curb corporate tax evasion, Crocker 
and Slemrod (2004) do not investigate the determinants of cross-sectional variation in corporate 
tax aggressiveness. 
 
17 See Cuccia (1994) for a detailed review of the early tax compliance literature. 
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Chen and Chu (2005) propose a model for corporate tax evasion that incorporates a 
contract between the risk-neutral owners of the firm and a risk-averse agent, responsible for filing 
the tax returns.  In a traditional model of individual tax evasion, the individual weighs the higher 
payoff from evading taxes against the probability of being detected and the penalty imposed by 
the tax authority.   Chen and Chu (2005) argue that in addition to the traditional income vs. risk 
trade-off, corporate tax evasion involves the trade-off between efficiency loss of internal control 
and the expected gain from evasion.  In their primary model, the efficiency loss comes from an 
incomplete contract between the firm’s owners and the manager which induces distortions on the 
manager’s effort.  The incomplete contract arises from the illegal nature of tax evasion.  An 
efficient contract requires that the owners share risk with the manager by paying the manager a 
higher wage when the illegal tax evasion is detected.  However, such a contract would be 
practically impossible to enforce as a court is unlikely to honor a contract based on illegal 
activity.   
Chen and Chu (2005) also discuss two other possible sources for inefficiency related to 
tax evasion: (1) creating a vaguer contract to avoid detection, and (2) giving increased discretion 
to the manager to over-report costs and under-report income.  In the first, the owners trade-off an 
optimally efficient contract which includes the maximum available number of informational 
valuable variables on the manager’s effort with an increasing probability of being detected when 
the manager’s contract is more detailed and open to the public.  Since an optimal contract would 
also make it easier for the tax authority to detect evasion, the owners choose to create a vaguer 
contract and incur an efficiency loss in internal control.  The second source of inefficiency 
follows logic also outlined by Desai and Dharmapala (2006) and discussed below.  Essentially, 
the activities that the manager engages in to evade taxes are also activities that allow the manager 
to divert the firm’s resources for himself.  Chen and Chu (2005) provide a simplified example in 
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which a restaurant manger is asked to evade taxes by not issuing receipts to cash-transaction 
customers (under-reporting income).  However, by giving the manager discretion over recording 
revenue, the owners have opened the door for the manager to simply pocket a portion of the cash 
from un-reported sales for himself.   
The results from Chen and Chu’s (2005) model suggest that the condition for profitable 
tax evasion is more stringent for firms than for individuals because firms trade-off the higher 
payoff from tax evasion against two considerations, risk and efficiency loss of internal control.  
As such, their model provides some explanation for the under-sheltering puzzle.  Their model is 
also consistent with work by Desai and Dharmapala (2006) and suggests that cross-sectional 
variation in firms’ internal control mechanisms may help explain why some firms engage in more 
aggressive tax behavior than others.   
 
2.2 Archival Studies of Corporate Tax Avoidance
 Motivated by policy debate on corporate tax burdens, especially surrounding TRA86, 
several studies examine the relation between firm size and tax avoidance (e.g. Shevlin and Porter 
1992; Manzon and Smith 1994; Gupta and Newberry 1997).  These studies measure tax 
avoidance using firms’ ETRs.  The political clout hypothesis suggests that larger firms are more 
successful at lobbying for tax breaks, and as a result, have disproportionately lower tax burdens.  
The political cost hypothesis, on the other hand, posits that large, politically sensitive firms are 
more likely to be the target of regulatory actions and wealth transfers, and thus face higher ETRs 
(Watts and Zimmerman 1986).  Gupta and Newberry (1997) try to reconcile prior mixed findings 
on the relation between firm size and ETRs by examining the variance in corporate ETRs using 
panel data.  They find that ETRs are not associated with firm size after controlling for cross-
sectional variation in other firm characteristics, namely capital structure, asset mix and 
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performance.  Gupta and Newberry (1997) do not explicitly consider aggressive corporate tax 
avoidance in the manner of recent studies.  Nonetheless, their results tie variation in corporate tax 
avoidance to variation in underlying firm characteristics and suggest that not all firms face the 
same opportunities to avoid taxation. 
 Building on studies like Gupta and Newberry (1997), Rego (2003) examines the tax 
avoidance opportunities of multinational firms.  She finds that, ceteris paribus, larger firms have 
higher ETRs.  However, multinational firms, especially those with extensive foreign operations, 
have relatively lower world-wide ETRs.  Overall her results suggest that there are significant 
economies of scale for tax planning.  Like Gupta and Newberry (1997), Rego (2003) provides 
evidence that ETRs vary based on differences in firms’ opportunities to engage in tax avoidance, 
which in turn vary predictably with certain firm characteristics.   
Gupta and Newberry (1997) and Rego (2003) both use ETRs to proxy for firms’ tax 
avoidance activities.  In more recent research, aggressive corporate tax reporting has been 
measured using book-tax differences.  This trend stems from Treasury’s (1999) report which 
points to large and increasing book-tax income differences as evidence of growing tax shelter 
activity.  Below I discuss three studies that investigate aggressive tax reporting using book-tax 
differences: Desai and Dharmapala (2006), Frank et al. (2006) and Manzon and Plesko (2002).  
 Desai and Dharmapala (2006) investigate the link between incentive compensation and 
tax sheltering.  They measure incentive compensation as the value of stock option grants to 
executives as a fraction of their total compensation and measure tax sheltering as the residual 
from a regression of the firm’s total book-tax difference on total accruals.  To the extent tax 
avoidance is pro-shareholder, one would expect managers whose incentives are more closely 
aligned with shareholders would behave more like residual claimants and engage in tax avoidance 
more aggressively.  However, Desai and Dharmapala (2006) find that increases in incentive 
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compensation are associated with lower levels of tax sheltering.  They explain this counter-
intuitive result using a model in which managers (1) have private information about true earnings 
(Y), (2) choose a level of income to reveal to the shareholders (Y S) and a level of income to reveal 
to the tax authorities (Y T) and (3) are assumed to gain utility from the amount of earnings, D = Y 
– Y S , diverted from the shareholders.  The key to the model is the possibility for a 
complementary relationship between managers’ sheltering and diversion activities.  Desai and 
Dharmapala (2006) argue that to shelter income from taxation, managers obscure the underlying 
economics of certain transactions and this obfuscation provides a shield for managers to divert 
income for themselves.  
 In Desai and Dharmapala’s (2006) model, managers can report opportunistically to 
shareholders and tax authorities and the technologies of sheltering and diversion can be 
complementary.  From this model, Desai and Dharmapala (2006) derive two main results.  The 
first result is that the relationship between tax avoidance and managerial incentives is ambiguous 
and depends on the relationship between the technologies of sheltering and diversion.  When the 
technologies of sheltering and diversion are complementary, closely aligned managerial and 
shareholder interests can result in less tax sheltering.  Desai and Dharmapala (2006) describe this 
result as a positive feedback effect between sheltering and diversion.  The model, thus, provides 
an explanation for their otherwise contrary empirical results.   
 The second result is that the relationship between managerial incentives and tax 
sheltering is mediated by a firm’s corporate governance characteristics.  In well-governed firms, 
the manager responds to increases in incentives by engaging in higher levels of sheltering but not 
diversion.  Strong governance makes additional diversion prohibitively costly; the positive 
feedback effect between sheltering and diversion will not occur when diversion is close to zero.  
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However, the positive feedback effect can occur when managers face relatively weak governance 
structures. 
 Desai and Dharmapala (2006) interpret their basic results, a negative relationship 
between increases in incentive compensation and tax sheltering, as evidence that overall (1) the 
technologies between sheltering and diversion are complementary and (2) the underlying quality 
of corporate governance is sufficiently low that increases in managerial incentives have the 
primary effect of decreasing diversion and thereby decreasing sheltering through positive 
feedback effects.  Desai and Dharmapala (2006) also estimate the effect of incentive 
compensation on sheltering separately for subsamples of well-governed and weakly-governed 
firms.  Consistent with the model’s predictions, they find that the negative effect of incentive 
compensation on sheltering only exists for the weakly-governed firms; however, their interaction 
term between incentive compensation and governance is not statistically significant.  Overall, 
Desai and Dharmapala’s (2006) study suggests that the relationship between managerial 
incentives and tax sheltering is not as straightforward as one might first assume and that this 
relationship is likely different for well-governed versus weakly-governed firms.   
The 1990’s saw a significant increase in both corporate tax shelter activity and aggressive 
financial accounting behavior.  Although Desai and Dharmapala (2006) do not directly test the 
relationship between aggressive financial reporting and aggressive tax reporting, their hypothesis 
development relies on the notion of a complementary relationship between the technologies of 
diversion and the technologies of sheltering taxable income.  Earlier tradeoff literature examines 
the interaction between financial reporting costs and tax costs and suggests that while neither 
consideration consistently dominates managers’ decision-making, firms facing fewer financial 
reporting constraints are more likely to engage in tax minimizing strategies that result in reporting 
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lower book income.18  In contrast to the decisions studied in the tradeoff literature, recent tax 
avoidance strategies often produce permanent book-tax differences and provide managers with 
opportunities to minimize the firm’s tax liability without lowering financial reporting income.19  
Moreover, permanent book-tax differences reduce the firm’s ETR, thereby increasing financial 
statement net income.  This characteristic of recent tax avoidance strategies, the generation book-
tax differences, suggests a positive relationship between aggressive tax reporting and aggressive 
financial reporting. 
Frank et al. (2006) explore the potential relationship between aggressive financial 
reporting and aggressive tax reporting, using discretionary accruals to measure aggressive 
financial reporting and discretionary book-tax differences to measure aggressive tax reporting.  
These two measures, discretionary accruals and discretionary book-tax differences, are analogous 
in their construction.  Both infer that in a regression designed to capture known causes for 
variation, the residual is related to managerial opportunism.   
Unlike Desai and Dharmapala (2006), Frank et al. (2006) do not develop a complex 
hypothesis to explain cross-sectional variation in aggressive tax reporting.  They simply posit that 
some firms have an overall tendency for aggressive corporate behavior which simultaneously 
affects their financial and tax reports.  In general, Frank et al. (2006) find a positive correlation 
 
18 See Shackelford and Shevlin (2001) for a review of the tradeoff literature.  Examples of commonly 
studied tax and financial reporting tradeoff decisions include: inventory management in LIFO firms 
(Dhaliwal, Frankel, and Trezevant 1994; Hunt, Moyer, and Shevlin 1996), choice between qualified and 
non-qualified stock options (Matsunaga, Shevlin, and Shores 1992), and use of hybrid debt instruments 
(Engel, Erickson, and Maydew 1999). 
19 It is important to note that one major source of tax savings, the use of stock option compensation, does 
not produce a book-tax difference per se.   Employee exercises of non-qualified stock options (NQSOs) 
generate a deduction for the granting firm for tax purposes, but prior to SFAS. 123R firms generally 
recognized no expense for NQSOs for financial reporting purposes.  Thus, like other permanent book-tax 
differences, NQSOs decreased taxable income without decreasing book income.  However, APB No. 25 
required that the tax benefits related to NQSOs be credited directly to additional paid-in-capital.   
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between their proxies for financial and tax aggressiveness.  However, using a simultaneous 
equations model to control for endogeneity, they find that firms that are aggressive for financial 
reporting purposes typically have more aggressive tax reporting, but not vice versa.  While their 
study provides some evidence on the firm-characteristics associated with aggressive tax reporting 
behavior, measuring corporate tax aggressiveness using book-tax difference is imperfect.   
Motivated by Treasury’s (1999) report, Manzon and Plesko (2002) conduct a thorough 
exploration of the magnitude and source of documented book-tax differences.  Specifically, 
Manzon and Plesko (2002) model book-tax differences as a function of variables that capture: (1) 
demand for tax-favored investing and financing activities, (2) specific factors that generate timing 
and permanent book-tax differences and (3) factors that may create noise in the estimation of 
either financial or taxable income.  Comparing R2s from the same model applied across years, 
Manzon and Plesko (2002) find that the ability of these variables to predict book-tax differences 
has remained fairly constant over time.  Their evidence and interpretation suggests that growing 
book-tax differences are not necessarily the result of increased tax shelter activity and highlight 
the problems associated with using book-tax differences to proxy for tax shelter use.   
In their study of corporate debt policy, Graham and Tucker (2006) are the first to employ 
a sample of known tax shelter participants.  Following logic developed by DeAngelo and Masulis 
(1980), Graham and Tucker (2006) posit that tax shelters serve as non-debt tax shields and 
substitute for the use of debt.  Consistent with their hypothesis, Graham and Tucker (2006) find 
that compared to firms with similar pre-shelter debt ratios, the debt ratios of their sample of tax 
shelter participants fall by about 8%.  While Graham and Tucker (2006) introduce the use of a 
sample of tax shelter participants and contribute to our understanding of the effect of tax 
sheltering on other corporate policies, their study does not directly address the determinants of tax 
shelter use.  I draw on Graham and Tucker’s (2006) use of actual tax shelter participants and 
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explore, in-depth, the cross-sectional firm characteristics associated with the decision to engage in 
aggressive tax reporting. 
Concurrent research by Wilson (2007) also examines firm characteristics associated with 
tax shelter use.  Wilson (2007) augments the sample used by Graham and Tucker (2006) with a 
set of observations identified through a search of the Factiva Database for articles referencing tax 
shelter use.   Using a sample of firms identified ex post as having participated in a tax shelter, 
Wilson (2007) finds that tax shelter participation is positively associated with firm size, large 
book-tax differences, the existence of foreign operations, and aggressive financial reporting 
practices.  
On the surface, Wilson’s (2007) study is similar to mine, however important differences 
distinguish the two.  Wilson’s (2007) sample of 51 sheltering firms includes at least eight 
different types of tax shelters.  I outline the advantages and disadvantages of studying a single 
shelter type, rather than multiple shelter types, in Chapter 4.  Furthermore, Wilson (2007) sets out 
to model identifying characteristics of tax shelter participants, while I try to model the firm’s 
decision to adopt a tax shelter.  For example, I hypothesize that a firm’s set of alternative tax 
savings opportunities will effect its decision to adopt a shelter and find that firms with foreign 
operations, measured one year prior to the year of shelter adoption, are less likely to adopt the 
COLI shelter.  Wilson (2007), on the other hand, finds that tax shelter participation is positively 
associated with the existence of foreign operations, measured during the period of shelter use.  
Wilson’s (2007) model identifies markers of current tax shelter participation, rather than 
predictors of tax shelter adoption. 
Chapter 3 develops my three main hypotheses.  H1, that firms who report aggressively 
for financial purposes are more likely to engage in a tax shelter, is similar to Wilson (2007).  
Wilson (2007) finds that the incidence of tax sheltering is positively associated with long-term 
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accrual based earnings management.  He also finds that the incidence of tax sheltering is 
associated with book-tax differences during the sheltering period.  In other words he finds that 
sheltering firms have higher discretionary accruals and higher book-tax differences during the 
years the shelter is being used, relative to firms who do not use shelters.  In Part II, I use two 
similar variables to test whether COLI participants exhibit signs of aggressive book or tax 
reporting prior to adopting a shelter.  I do not find a significant relationship between the level of 
discretionary accruals or the level of book-tax differences over the prior three years and the 
likelihood that a firm will adopt a COLI shelter. 
 My second hypothesis, H2, posits that a firm with fewer alternative tax savings 
opportunities is more likely to adopt a tax shelter, and I include several variables designed to 
capture the firm’s alternative tax savings opportunity set.  Based on Graham and Tucker’s (2006) 
research, Wilson (2007) includes a few of these same variables.  However, in Wilson’s (2007) 
model, these variables serve to capture the characteristics of the various tax shelters that his 
sample includes.  In contrast, I study a single tax shelter.  Thus, my predictions for these variables 
differ from Wilson’s.  He finds that the incidence of tax sheltering is associated with lower levels 
of leverage and higher levels of foreign operations.  I find that COLI adoption is associated with 
lower leverage and lower foreign activity in the year preceding adoption.    
My third hypothesis, H3, posit that the manager’s desire to protect the firm’s reputation 
will affect the decision to participate in a tax shelter, a factor not considered by Wilson (2007).  
The development of H2 and H3 reflects an incremental contribution to the literature on tax 
shelters.  Furthermore, Part II of this study examines the spread of tax shelter use, a research 
agenda not explored by Wilson (2007). 
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Chapter 3 - Hypothesis Development 
Slemrod remarks that, “little is known about how and why, holding constant the chance 
of getting caught and the penalty for noncompliance, corporations differ among themselves in 
their aggressiveness regarding pushing the envelope of the tax law...” (2004, p. 884).  Standard 
economic models of tax compliance indicate that evasion is a function of the probability of 
detection, penalties and the taxpayer’s risk aversion. These models focus on illegal tax evasion by 
individuals.  As such, predictions from these traditional models may not explain cross-sectional 
differences in the adoption of corporate tax shelters.  To better understand the firm characteristics 
associated with tax shelter use, I investigate cross-sectional differences in firms’ incentives, 
opportunities, and costs.   
 
3.1 Incentives to Report Aggressively 
Prior research finds that firms trade-off the benefit of reporting lower taxable income 
with the cost of reporting lower financial statement income when managers are forced to make 
conforming tax and financial reporting decisions (Shackelford and Shevlin 2001).  However, 
recent tax avoidance strategies produce book-tax differences and enable managers to reduce the 
firm’s tax liability without reducing financial statement net income.  Some strategies produce 
temporary book-tax differences, but shelters that produce permanent book-tax differences are the 
most sought after (Treasury 1999; Weisbach 2002).  Tax shelters that permanently reduce the 
firm’s ETR are a win-win for managers; these strategies simultaneously reduce taxable income 
and increase after-tax financial statement income. Consequently, recent tax shelters enable 
managers to simultaneously report low taxable income and high financial income.  
Figure 1 details the financial income reporting of COLI transactions and uses 
hypothetical numbers to depict how the tax loss produced by a COLI program can generate 
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positive after-tax financial statement income.  In terms of its book income effect, the COLI 
shelter is an archetype of recent corporate tax shelters.  Examples of other tax shelters that 
produce permanent book-tax differences include the cross-border dividend capture (CBDC) 
shelter and the use of offshore intellectual proper havens (OIPH).  In the CBDC shelter, a U.S. 
corporation captures foreign tax credits from foreign shareholders, who have no use for the 
credits, when it buys a foreign stock cum-dividend and sells the stock ex-dividend.  The short-
term capital loss on the transaction offsets the dividend income, while the foreign withholding tax 
credit produces a permanent reduction in the U.S. corporation’s ETR.  Like transfer pricing 
strategies, the purpose of an OIPH is to shift income to a foreign subsidiary in a lower-tax 
jurisdiction.  To the extent that the U.S. corporation designates the foreign subsidiary’s profits as 
“permanently reinvested”, this strategy will produce a permanent reduction in the U.S. 
corporation’s ETR.  Because these tax shelters both reduce the firm’s tax liability and 
simultaneously increase the firm’s after-tax book income, they likely appeal to managers who 
want to avoid taxes as well as those who want to manage financial reporting income upwards, 
suggesting a link between aggressive tax reporting and aggressive financial reporting. 
In recent research, Desai and Dharmapala (2006) and Frank et al. (2006) both posit a  link 
between aggressive financial reporting and aggressive tax reporting, offering two additional lines 
of reasoning.  Desai (2005) and Desai and Dharmapala (2006) argue that the activities that allow 
managers to shelter taxable income also create financial reporting opacity which allows managers 
to divert firm resources.  Essentially, Desai and Dharmapala (2006) suggest that the technologies 
of sheltering income and inflating book income are complementary, and inflating book income 
allows managers to garner more perquisites for themselves.  Desai and Dharmapala’s (2006) 
hypotheses depend on a link between aggressive tax reporting and aggressive financial reporting; 
however, they do not explicitly test for a positive relationship between the two.    
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Frank et al. (2006) hypothesize that some firms have an overall tendency toward 
aggressive corporate behavior, which simultaneously impacts both their financial and tax 
reporting decisions.  They find that firms who are aggressive for financial reporting purposes are 
typically aggressive for tax reporting purposes.  To measure aggressive tax reporting, Frank et al. 
(2006) use the residual from a regression of permanent book-tax differences on items known to 
cause permanent differences and earnings management incentives.  Frank et al. (2006) try to 
isolate discretionary permanent differences; however, many of their control variables (i.e. 
intangibles, state taxes and pretax income) are likely correlated with the decision to engage in 
aggressive tax reporting.  
I formally test for a relationship between aggressive financial reporting and aggressive 
tax reporting and hypothesize:  
H1: Firms that report aggressively for financial statement purposes will be more 
likely to adopt the COLI shelter 
 
 
3.2 Opportunities to Report Aggressively 
 Prior research finds that ETRs vary cross-sectionally with firms’ tax planning 
opportunities (Gupta and Newberry 1997; Rego 2003).  For example, firms with greater capital 
intensity tend to have lower ETRs as a result of tax preferences associated with investments in 
capital assets (Gupta and Newberry 1997).  Similarly, firms with extensive foreign operations 
have lower ETRs consistent with greater opportunities for tax avoidance through income-shifting 
(Rego 2003). In a study of corporate multi-state tax planning, Gupta and Mills (2004) find that 
firms’ state income ETRs first decrease then increase as a function of the number of states in 
which they file, consistent with greater opportunities for income-shifting when firms start doing 
business in multiple states.  Grubert and Slemrod emphasize that, “the ability to shift income is 
itself affected by the pattern of real operations” (1998, p.365).  For many years, income from 
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Puerto Rican affiliates was essentially tax-free; however, Grubert and Slemrod (1998) find that 
investment in Puerto Rico is dominated by firms who can take advantage of intangible income 
shifting opportunities. 
Both legitimate and aggressive tax avoidance opportunities vary with firm-specific 
income and asset characteristics. Some firms are eligible for codified corporate tax breaks such as 
R&D credits, export incentives and accelerated depreciation.  The magnitude of the tax benefits 
available to these firms is often evident in their tax footnote rate reconciliations.  In a competitive 
capital market, firms with fewer legitimate opportunities to avoid taxation or those who feel 
pressured to maintain their low ETRs and have already exhausted their legitimate avenues may be 
more likely to engage in aggressive tax shelters.    
Furthermore, each shelter has its own technology, exploiting a different part of the Code; 
and the ability of any one firm to profit from a shelter depends on whether the firm’s operations 
match the shelter’s technology. For example, the contested liability acceleration strategy (CLAS) 
enabled firms to accelerate the timing of tax deductions for lawsuit settlements and other legal 
claims using a trust.  Thus, the shelter was only beneficial to firms with significant contingent 
liabilities.  Recent high profile tax shelters take advantage of foreign entities, foreign operations, 
intellectual property and long-lived assets.20   
In early literature on the effect of taxes on capital structure, DeAngelo and Masulis 
(1980) find that leverage is less in firms with alternative tax shields like depreciation, suggesting 
that interest deductions and other tax shields are substitutes.  Later empirical tests of the 
substitution effect build on DeAnfelo and Masulis’s (1980) initial finding.  MacKie-Mason 
(1990) develops the tax exhaustion hypothesis, positing that the substitution effect is stronger for 
 
20 See Bankman (1999) and Graham and Tucker (2006) for discussion of specific examples including 
lease-in-lease-out (LILO), transfer pricing, offshore intellectual property havens (OIPH), cross-border 
dividend capture (CBDC).  
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firms near the loss of their tax shields.  Dhaliwal, Trezevant, and Wang (1992) test the tax 
exhaustion hypothesis and find a negative association between non-debt and debt tax shields.   
Trezevant (1992) examines changes in firms’ available debt tax shields and investment tax 
shields surrounding the Economic Recovery Act of 1981 and finds support for both the 
substitution effect and the tax exhaustion effect.  These papers highlight the impact that the firm’s 
tax savings opportunity set has on managers’ choices regarding capital structure. 
In recent work on tax shelters, Graham and Tucker (2006) describe corporate tax shelters 
as, “separate lever(s) that a corporate tax planner can pull to reduce tax obligations in any given 
year.”  They find that firms appear to trade-off interest deductions with non-debt tax shields (tax 
shelters) as predicted by DeAngelo and Masulis (1980).  By extension, I predict that the 
probability that a firm will engage in one particular shelter depends on the number of other levers 
available to the tax planner.  Earlier literature tests whether the substitutability of debt and non-
debt tax shields helps explain managers’ financing decisions.  I, on the other hand, test whether 
firms’ available tax shields effect managers’ decisions to engage in an aggressive tax shelter.  
Stated formally, 
H2: Firms with fewer alternative shelter substitutes will be more likely to adopt the 
COLI shelter  
 
 
3.3 Costs of Reporting Aggressively 
On the surface, the cost of reporting aggressively seems obvious.  If caught, the taxpayer 
will have to forego any tax savings and pay penalties and interest as prescribed in the IRC and 
Treasury Regulations.  Indeed, early studies on taxpayer compliance model the evasion decision 
in terms of costs and benefits where the cost of noncompliance is a function of the probability of 
detection and the penalty structure (Allingham and Sandmo 1972; Srinivasan 1973).  
Analytically, these models predict that as the probability of audit or the magnitude of penalties 
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increases, noncompliance decreases.  But as Slemrod (2004) points out, these models may not be 
very helpful in explaining cross-sectional differences in corporate tax aggressiveness. 
First, there is little variation in the probability of detection or the penalty structure faced 
by large corporations.  Under its Large and Mid-Sized Business (LMSB) Division, the IRS audits 
large firms, those with assets greater then $10 million, nearly every year.21  Consequently, the 
probability of being audited is relatively constant across these taxpayers.  Likewise, penalties for 
noncompliance are a function of misstated income, not firm characteristics, and thus do not 
explain cross-sectional differences in corporate tax aggressiveness.  Second, since early models 
focus on individual taxpayers rather than corporate taxpayers, these models do not consider the 
unique costs (or benefits) of aggressive tax reporting faced by managers who, as agents, make tax 
reporting decisions on behalf of their shareholders.  
I investigate the impact of one such unique cost on the deterrence of corporate tax 
aggressiveness, the cost of damaging the firm’s reputation.  A large body of research documents 
that a good reputation is an intangible asset that accrues numerous benefits including: competitive 
advantage over rivals (Milgrom and Roberts 1982), easier access to capital (Stuart et al. 1999), 
and superior financial performance (Roberts and Dowling 2002).  Given the benefits of 
possessing a good reputation, managers have ample motivation to protect this intangible asset.  
Specifically, Fobrum and Shanley (1990) suggest that the desire to protect the firm’s reputation 
can inhibit managers from engaging in activities that shareholders may find objectionable. 
Managers may value their firms’ reputations, but it is not precisely clear whether or not 
shareholders find aggressive tax avoidance objectionable.  On the one hand, aggressive tax 
 
21 Currently the LMSB Division consists of two programs, the Coordinated Industry Cases (CIC) program 
which audits the 1,300 largest corporations and Industry Cases (IC) program which audits approximately 
50,000 more large corporations each year.  The CIC was formerly known as the Coordinated Examination 
Program (CEP). 
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avoidance is in the best interest of shareholders because, by minimizing the firm’s tax payments, 
aggressive avoidance activities maximize the after-tax value of the firm.  In fact, a manager who 
does not pursue every avenue to reduce taxes could be seen as a poor manager.  On the other 
hand, shareholders may be concerned that a manager who is aggressive in his reports to the IRS 
will also be overly aggressive in his financial reports to shareholders.    
While it is not clear whether shareholders themselves would find aggressive tax reporting 
objectionable, like managers, shareholders have a vested interest in protecting the firm’s 
reputation overall.  Thus, to the extent aggressive tax avoidance is associated with being a “poor 
corporate citizen,” firms with other significant constituencies, customers, employees and 
suppliers, could suffer reputation costs if identified as tax shelter participants.   Either way, 
whether the reputation repercussions come directly from shareholders, or indirectly through the 
firm’s other constituencies, concern over those repercussions could deter managers from 
engaging in aggressive tax reporting.  
Employee lawsuits and negative press coverage in the case of COLIs suggest that 
involvement in a tax shelter scandal can hurt a firm’s reputation.22  Prior research shows that 
firms suffer significant negative market reaction when their financial misdeeds are revealed 
(Karpoff and Lott 1993; Dechow and Sweeney 1996; Palmrose et al. 2004).  In their study of 
SEC enforcement actions, Karpoff et al. (2006) find that 66% of the total market loss upon 
disclosure of misconduct can be attributed to a loss in reputation and that, on average, the 
reputational penalty exceeds the legal penalty by more than seven and one-half times.23  In 
 
22 Families of decedents who were insured under broad-based COLI programs have filed suits (see Rice v. 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 12 F. Supp. 2d 1207, Mayo v. Hartford Life Ins. Co. 220 F. Supp. 2d 714, Tillman v. 
Camelot Music, Inc. 408 F. 3d 1300).   
23 Recent tax shelters were marketed with carefully crafted opinion letters from tax lawyers to insure 
against legal penalties and fines. 
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recent work, Hanlon and Slemrod (2007) find that although the reaction is smaller than for 
financial accounting fraud, on average a company’s stock price does decline upon news of 
involvement in a tax shelters.   
The political cost hypothesis predicts that large, politically sensitive firms attempt to 
avoid public scrutiny (Watts and Zimmerman 1986).24  To avoid public scrutiny, these firms are 
more likely to use accounting methods that reduce financial statement income and less likely to 
engage in tax avoidance behavior.  Guenther (1994) tests the political cost hypothesis in a tax 
setting.  He finds that larger firms are more likely to have income decreasing accruals in the year 
prior to the 1986 corporate tax rate reduction.  In Guenther’s (1994) setting, tax savings are 
exogenous; he does not directly test whether political costs curb managers’ tax avoidance 
activities.  Instead, Guenther (1994) shows that 1) in general, firms defer recognition of income to 
take advantage of lower post-TRA86 tax rates and 2) large, politically sensitive firms 
simultaneously reported lower financial statement income to defuse potential scrutiny over their 
tax deferrals.  The evidence presented in Guenther (1994) suggests that politically sensitive firms 
will be less likely to engage in aggressive tax avoidance strategies that produce large book-tax 
differences. 
Regardless of the ex post repercussions of being identified as a tax avoider, I expect that 
concern for the firm’s reputation to deter some managers from participating in the COLI shelter.  
Similarly, I expect managers’ reputational concerns to vary depending on how visible their firm is 
in the capital market.  A reputational concerns effect is also consistent with the political cost 
hypothesis which predicts that highly visible (politically sensitive) firms will avoid actions that 
 
24 In contrast, the political clout hypothesis predicts that large firms are more likely to influence corporate 
tax policy and obtain special tax breaks relative to small firms.  Results from studies examining the 
political cost and political clout hypotheses using firms’ ETRs as measure of political success are mixed 
(see Wang 1991; Gupta and Newberry 1997; Rego 2003). 
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increase the likelihood of regulators imposing wealth transfers (Watts and Zimmerman 1986).   
Therefore, I hypothesize: 
H3: Firms with greater reputation concerns will be less likely to adopt the COLI 
shelter.
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Chapter 4 – Research Methodology 
4.1 Data and Sample Construction   
4.1.1 The COLI Setting 
This paper investigates aggressive corporate tax reporting in a particular setting, 
corporate-owned life insurance. There are both advantages and disadvantages to using this 
setting.  The primary advantage of this study is the use of actual tax shelter participants to model 
the determinants of aggressive tax reporting.  Aggressive tax avoidance can be difficult to define; 
the difference between legitimate tax planning and a tax shelter is not black and white.  More 
appropriately, tax avoidance can be thought of as a spectrum of behaviors where the threshold 
between more aggressive tax reporting and less aggressive tax reporting is subjective.  Even legal 
scholars have difficulty in both pinpointing the threshold and determining when an activity falls 
on the illegitimate side of the threshold.  In this study, I do not have to define that threshold or try 
to measure which firms fall on which side; the IRS, the courts and Congress have determined that 
COLI transactions cross the line and are not a legitimate tax planning strategy.   
The second advantage of my setting is that I construct a sample of tax shelter adopters 
that is not limited to the group of adopters whose activities were later uncovered by the IRS.  
Selection bias poses a significant problem for any study of firms’ tax shelter activity.  Shelters are 
secretive by nature, so any sample of shelter users is naturally biased toward those participants 
who got caught.  Graham and Tucker (2006) use a sample of firms who were caught and/or filed 
suit regarding their shelter activity.  For Graham and Tucker (2006), shelter participation is a 
proxy for non-debt tax shields, which they hypothesize and find influence firms’ debt structures.  
Hanlon and Slemrod (2007) collect a sample of firms whose tax shelter participation is 
subsequently revealed when the firm comes under IRS scrutiny.  Hanlon and Slemrod (2007) 
investigate the market reaction when firms’ tax reporting misconduct is revealed.  Neither 
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Graham and Tucker (2006) nor Hanlon and Slemrod (2007) investigate the determinants of tax 
shelter use as their primary research agenda, thus, the sample selection bias in defining shelter 
firms as only those firms that got caught is not particularly problematic in these studies.  On the 
other hand, the purpose of my study is to model and test the influence of firm-characteristics on 
the likelihood of shelter use.  To understand managers’ decisions to adopt tax shelters, I ideally 
need a sample that includes all firms who decide to adopt a particular tax shelter, not just the 
subset of firms whose sheltering activities have been detected by tax authorities.   
For several reasons, COLI represents a good opportunity to obtain a sample reflective of 
the true population of shelter adopters, rather than a sample limited to firms who got caught.  In 
1996 Congress enacted laws to formally shut the COLI shelter down.  The IRS also successfully 
litigated against COLI, and given its success and the law change, in 2001 the IRS offered an 
amnesty program.  That amnesty program provides a chance to uncover firms who engaged in a 
tax shelter but were not caught.  While other shelters of the same era have been uncovered, 
litigated against, and included in amnesty programs, COLI has arguably been the IRS’s most 
notable success and thus represents the largest potential number of observable adopters for a 
single tax shelter.  Notably, COLI users make up the second largest group of tax shelter cases 
identified by Wilson (2007) who builds on Graham and Tucker’s (2006) sample; the largest group 
are transfer pricing cases, some of which extend back to the mid-1970s prior to the recent tax 
shelter boom.  
Unlike Graham and Tucker (2006), Hanlon and Slemrod (2007) and Wilson (2007), I 
examine a single shelter type.  The decision to use a single shelter is primarily dictated by the 
research questions and hypotheses detailed in Part II of this paper.  Part II addresses the spread of 
tax shelter adoption.  To model the spread of tax shelter use, I need to identify a specific strategy, 
when it was first available and when each firm first adopted the strategy.  However, the use of a 
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single shelter type has another advantage.  As discussed in the development of H2, different 
shelters exploit different nuances in the Code, and the ability of a particular firm to benefit from a 
particular shelter depends on a match between the technology of the shelter and the nature of the 
firm’s income, expenses, assets and liabilities.  A single shelter type generates similar incentives.  
By focusing on a single shelter, I can concentrate on identifying firm-differences in the 
propensity to report aggressively and my tests are not confounded by differences among the 
shelters.   
The primary disadvantage of using a single shelter setting is that it results in a small 
sample size.  However, current working papers on corporate shelter use have similarly small 
samples.  For example, Hanlon and Slemrod (2007) scan over 6,000 press articles but only 
identify a total of 97 firms involved in tax shelters between 1990 and 2004.  Wilson’s (2007) final 
sample includes 51 firms involved in several different shelters.  The other major disadvantage of 
using a single setting is that my results are not necessarily generalizable to participants of other 
shelters or to less egregious forms of corporate tax avoidance.  Using a sample of known tax 
shelter participants instead of an estimated measure of aggressive tax reporting like discretionary 
book-tax differences results in greater construct validity, but stronger construct validity comes at 
the cost of weaker external validity. 
 
4.1.2 Identifying COLI Shelter Participants
I use Lexis-Nexis to search company financial statements for evidence of COLI use.  I 
query the 1984-1995 NAARS database of financial statements using the following string: 
(company or corporate) w/5 owned w/5 life w/5 insurance w/10 (tax or taxes).  This search 
captures any firm that mentions “corporate owned life insurance” in any portion of its 10-K filing.  
For example, the following are excerpts from Marriott International’s 1995 annual report.  The 
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top excerpt was included in the annual report as part of Management’s Discussion and Analysis 
(MD&A), and the bottom excerpt is the reconciliation of the firm’s effective tax rate to the 
statutory tax rate provided in the notes to the financial statements.  
The Company's effective income tax rate declined to 40.0% from 41.5% in 
the preceding year, despite expiration of federal jobs tax credit 
programs, due to the impact of the Company's corporate-owned life 
insurance program and certain other investments.  The effective income 
tax rate is expected to decline to approximately 39% in 1996… 
Corporate expenses increased 8% in 1994, and included costs associated 
with a corporate-owned life insurance program adopted late in the year.” 
 
 
  1995 1994 1993 
U.S. statutory tax rate 35.0% 35.0% 35.0%
State income taxes, net of U.S. tax benefit 5.0 5.0 6.0 
Corporate-owned life insurance (1.2) - - 
Tax credits (1.4) (0.7) (0.8) 




Since recent IRS court victories regarding the COLI shelter prompted several firms to 
come forward and settle their disputes with the IRS, I also use the same text string, (company or 
corporate) w/5 owned w/5 life w/5 insurance w/10 (tax or taxes), to search through news articles 
and press releases for potential COLI investors.  My initial search of 10-K filings and press 
coverage results in 213 possible COLI adopters.  I exclude 28 life insurance companies because 
these firms serve as the other party in the COLI tax shelter transaction.  Although corporate-
owned life insurance was effectively shut down in 1996, the restrictions enacted in 1996 left open 
a loophole for bank-owned life insurance.  Therefore, I exclude 32 banks from my sample of 
COLI shelter participants. After excluding banks and insurance firms, my initial keyword search 
of financial statements and press releases results in 153 potential COLI shelter participants.   
In this study, I am interested in firms that participate in the tax shelter variety of COLI. I 
examine the remaining 153 firms’ financial statements in detail to confirm participation in broad-
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based, leveraged COLI.  From the initial keyword search sample, I identify COLI shelter adopters 
in one of two ways: 1) I include a firm in the shelter sample when the firm’s tax footnote rate 
reconciliation includes a line item for COLI tax benefits prior to 1996, and 2) I include a firm in 
the shelter sample when the firm’s post-1995 financial statements reveal involvement in the 
COLI shelter prior to 1996.25  I assume that firms whose COLI programs give rise to tax benefits 
material enough to warrant a line-item on the tax rate reconciliation are involved in broad-based, 
leveraged COLI and include these firms in my shelter sample.  I identify additional shelter 
participants from their financial statement references to COLI when these firms, involved in IRS 
disputes or settlements, disclose, ex post, their COLI participation.   
Firms often purchase corporate-owned life insurance for legitimate business purposes, 
including insuring against the loss of key executives and providing a perk for outside directors.26  
Thus, I exclude firms from my shelter sample when the term corporate-owned life insurance is 
only mentioned in the 10-K in reference to programs for executive or directors.  After examining 
the financial statements of the 213 firms from my initial search, I identify 48 firms as COLI 
shelter participants.  My final COLI sample includes 44 firms with data from COMPUSTAT and 
CRSP necessary to calculate explanatory variables. 
To examine COLI adoptions, I need to determine the first year each sample firm began 
using the COLI shelter.  Although the true year of adoption, t*, cannot be observed perfectly, I 
 
25 Tax shelters are usually characterized by secrecy and using a sample of firms who openly disclose their 
activities in their financial statements may call into question whether these firms truly represent typical tax 
shelter users.   However, Bankman (2002) suggests that firms who think their shelter activities would need 
a cloak are less likely to engage in tax shelters, while those who decide to adopt have convinced themselves 
that their shelter activity meets a littoral reading of the tax law. 
 
26 In reviewing 10-Ks, I discovered several instances in which the firm purchased life insurance on its 
directors and designated a charitable organization of the director’s choice as the policy’s beneficiary. 
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use information in the firms’ financial statements to estimate the year of COLI adoption.  I denote 
the estimated year of adoption, t.  When a firm discloses its COLI participation in its rate 
reconciliation, unless subsequent footnote disclosures regarding COLI activity indicate otherwise, 
I set t equal to the first year in which COLI appears as a line item in the income tax footnote rate 
reconciliation.  Managers can exercise considerable discretion in amount of detail disclosed in the 
firm’s rate reconciliation; consequently, using rate reconciliation disclosures may lead to 
mismeasurement of t.  I also include some firms in the COLI sample based on disclosures of IRS 
disputes or settlements.  For these firms, I set t equal to the first year of COLI activity mentioned 
in connection with an IRS dispute or settlement. Noise introduced because the true year of COLI 
adoption, t*, occurs earlier than my measurement of t will bias against finding results for my 
hypotheses.  The year of COLI adoption ranges from 1986 to 1995.  
 
4.1.3 Control Samples  
The purpose of this study is to examine why seemingly similar firms differ in their tax 
reporting aggressiveness.  Thus, the objective of my research design is to identify those firms that 
are “seemingly similar” to my COLI shelter firms and test whether variables capturing 
hypothesized differences in the propensity to adopt a COLI shelter explain observed variation in 
COLI shelter participation.  I use a matched control research design as one level of control for 
nonequivalence and include several continuous control variables to further reduce nonequivalence 
between the COLI shelter firms and the control firms. 
Initially, I follow Graham and Tucker (2006) and form a size- and industry-matched 
control sample, Control Group A.27  I use industry classifications from Barth et al. (1998) and 
                                                 
27 Graham and Tucker (2006) employ a one-to-many match and include firms with a given sheltering 
firm’s 2-digit SIC code that have assets (ROA) within +/- 25% of the sheltering firm. 
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further partition durable manufacturers and retail firms following Barth et al. (2005).  Control 
Group A includes all firms within the matched industry whose assets are within +/- 25% of COLI 
firm’s assets in year t-1. 28  A firm may appear in Control Group A more than once if the firm 
matches two or more COLI firms with different start years (t) in the same industry.  Control 
Group A includes 416 firm-year observations consisting of 410 firms.   
Matching on size and industry is a standard method for constructing a sample of control 
firms that resemble one’s treatment firms.  However, when I match on industry I arguably control 
for the very difference that I hypothesize in H2 will influence a firm’s propensity to adopt a COLI 
shelter.  H2 hypothesizes that firms with fewer shelter substitutes will be more likely to engage in 
a tax shelter.  In particular, I note that while other tax savings opportunities are dependent on 
specific types of income or assets, any firm with a sizeable workforce can obtain tax benefits 
using COLI.  The variables I use to capture a firm’s alternative tax savings opportunities, R&D 
intensity, capital intensity, foreign operations, and intangibles, are highly correlated with industry 
classification.  By matching on industry, I limit the overall cross-sectional variation in these 
measures.  Therefore, I develop two additional control samples that are not based on industry 
classification. 
With Control Group B, my goal is to construct a sample of control firms that could have 
adopted a COLI shelter.  Again I match on size, since the scale of investment in a complex 
corporate tax shelter like the COLI shelter likely precludes participation from smaller-sized firms.  
In addition to size, Control Group B is based on the specific technology associated with the COLI 
shelter, number of employees.  While most tax shelters contemporary to the COLI shelter are 
only beneficial to taxpayers with certain income or assets of a certain nature, the COLI tax shelter 
 
28 When there is more than one COLI firm in an industry in year t, the control sample includes all 
nonCOLI firms whose assets are at least 75% of the smallest COLI-firm’s assets and no more than 125% of 
the largest COLI-firm’s assets.   
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is potentially beneficial to any firm with a reasonable-sized workforce.  Therefore, to construct 
Control Group B, I match on assets and workforce size.  I rank all COMPUSTAT firms into 
twenty groups based on assets (data 6).29  I further divide each asset rank into deciles based on 
the number of employees (data 29).  I identify the asset and employee ranks of each COLI firm in 
year t-1.  Then, I include any firms with matching asset and employee ranks in those years in 
Control Group B.  Similar to Control Group A, a firm may appear in Control Group B more than 
once if the firm matches two or more COLI firms with different start years (t).  Control Group B 
includes 401 firm-year observations consisting of 354 firms. 
The firms in Control Group B are similar to the COLI firms in one dimension, their 
ability to reasonably benefit from the COLI shelter.  However, the construction of Control Group 
B does not necessarily generate a group of control firms that resemble my COLI sample 
generally.  Ideally, I would like the control firms to be peers of the COLI firms who decided not 
to adopt the COLI shelter.  To better capture the COLI firms’ peers, I form a third control sample 
based on asset size and market-to-book (MTB) ratio.   Stemming from Fama and French’s (1993) 
three factor model, size and MTB have become standard controls for cross-sectional differences 
in firms’ average stock returns.  The power of MTB ratios to explain cross-sectional differences 
suggests that firms with similar MTB ratios share some combination of underlying 
characteristics.  Furthermore, Skinner and Sloan (2002) suggest that firms with high MTB have 
more to lose if they fail to meet analysts’ earnings expectations.  By matching on MTB, I try to 
obtain a control sample of firms under similar pressure to meet expectations.   
As in the match procedure for Control Group B, I first rank all COMPUSTAT firms into 
twenty groups based on assets (data 6).  Then, to construct Control Group C, I subdivide each 
 
29 I exclude firms with very small workforces (data 29 < .5), foreign incorporated firms, financial 
institutions (SIC codes 6000-6411), and insurance and real estate firms (6500-6999). 
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asset rank into deciles based on MTB, calculated as (data 199*data 25)/data 60.  I identify the 
asset and MTB ranks of each COLI firm in year t-1 and include any firms with matching asset 
and MTB ranks in those years in Control Group C.  As in the other two control samples, a firm 
may appear in Control Group C more than once if the firm matches two or more COLI firms with 
different start years (t).  Control Group C includes 380 firm-year observations consisting of 344 
firms. 
Testing my hypotheses using three different control samples has an additional benefit.  
The major contribution of my study is the use of known tax shelter participants to investigate 
aggressive corporate tax reporting.  Therefore, misclassification of either tax shelter participants 
or non-participants could pose a significant threat to the overall validity of my results.  I include a 
firm in my COLI participant sample only after detailed examination of the firm’s financial 
statements yields evidence of participation in broad-based, leveraged COLI.  Thus, the likelihood 
that I falsely identify a firm as a COLI participant is low.  While the probability of a false positive 
for my COLI sample is low, the probability of a false negative is significant.  Given the secretive 
nature of the tax shelter industry, my COLI participant sample is likely incomplete.  Using three 
different control samples provides some assurance that my results are not attributable to 
significant bias in identifying COLI shelter participants.  
My control samples could include firms who used COLI, but whose sheltering activities 
have not been detected or disclosed.30  Since tax shelter activity is difficult to detect, I include as 
many firms in the control samples as possible rather than using a one-to-one match technique, 
increasing the likelihood that at least some of the control firms did not use COLI.  Inclusion of 
COLI firms in the control samples will bias against finding results.  Given the method of 
 
30 As a precaution, I exclude six firms that appear in my initial 213 COLI sample from the control sample 
even though I cannot confirm that these firms used broad-based, leveraged COLI. 
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construction, some firm-year observations appear in more than one control sample; however, the 
overlap is small.  Of the 416 firm-year observations in Control Group A, forty-six (11.2 percent) 
are also in Control Group B and twenty-seven (6.5 percent) are also in Control Group C.  Only 3 
firm-year observations are included in all three control samples.  
Table 1 shows the distribution of firm-years across industries for the COLI sample and 
each of the control samples.  The 44 COLI firms are concentrated in 15 industries, with some 
clustering in the textiles, retail and utilities industries which comprise 13.64, 11.36 and 11.36 
percent of the COLI observations.  By construction, the firm-year observation in Control Group A 
are also concentrated in 15 industries.  The industry composition of the COLI sample and Control 
Group A is consistent, indicating that the matching procedure is reasonable.  Notably, Control 
Groups B and C include observations in the mining and construction, pharmaceuticals, instrument 
manufacturing and restaurant industries.   
 
4.2 Cross-Sectional Variation in Tax Avoidance 
4.2.1 Logit Model 
This study aims to better understand the factors that influence a firm’s decision to engage 
in aggressive tax reporting.  To achieve that goal, I examine a particular instance of aggressive 
tax reporting, participation in the COLI tax shelter.  H1-H3 posit that certain firm characteristics 
will affect the probability that a given firm adopts the COLI shelter.  To test these hypotheses, I 
match a sample of COLI shelter participants to benchmark control groups and test the effect of 
cross-sectional firm characteristics on the likelihood of COLI adoption using following logistic 
regression model: 
Pr(COLIi,t) =   β0 + β1PMDACC i,t + β2D_RDi,t-1 +β3CAPINTi,t-1 + β 4INTANGi,t-1 + (1)  
 β5FOREIGNi,t-1 + β6VOLi,t + β7BLOCKi,t + β8ANALYSTi,t + 
 β9lnEMPi,t-1 + β10ROAi,t-1 + β11MTBi,t-1  + β12MTRi,t-1 + 
 β13lnASSETSi,t + β14REL_ETRi,t + εi,t  
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where the dependent variable is an indicator equal to 1 if the firm participated in the COLI shelter 
and 0 otherwise.31
 
4.2.2 H1 Explanatory Variable  
 I test whether firms that report aggressively for financial statement purposes are more 
likely to report aggressively for tax purposes (H1) by including performance-matched 
discretionary accruals (PMDACC) in the model (Kothari et al. 2005).  H1 argues that aggressive 
tax reporting and aggressive financial reporting are complementary activities and that mangers’ 
overall tendencies to report aggressively will impact both tax and book income.  Like aggressive 
tax avoidance, aggressive financial reporting is difficult to define precisely and even more 
challenging to measure.  PMDACC captures a spectrum of financial reporting activities, from 
legitimate activities to egregiously opportunistic activities.  I could use a stricter measure of 
aggressive financial reporting, like SEC enforcement actions, designed to capture only egregious 
behavior.  However, measuring aggressive financial reporting using SEC enforcement actions, 
like measuring aggressive tax reporting using IRS notices of deficiency, would capture only a 
small portion of the spectrum of manager’s activities.  Given the argument developed in H1, I 
believe that using a broad measure of aggressive financial reporting is more appropriate than 
using a measure restricted to a small set of firms.  
Following Dechow et al. (1995), I define total accruals (TA) as the change in non-cash 
current assets minus the change in current liabilities excluding the current portion of long-term 
                                                 
31 Unlike a linear probability model, using a binary response model, like the logit in Eq. (1) ensures that the 
estimated response probabilities are strictly between zero and one.  
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debt, minus depreciation and amortization, scaled by lagged total assets.32  I estimate modified-
Jones discretionary accruals cross-sectionally each year using all firm-year observations in the 
same industry: 
 TAit =  γ1(1/ASSETSit-1) + γ2(∆SALESit - ∆RECit) + γ3PPEit + εit (2) 
where ∆SALESit is the change in sales (data 12) scaled by lagged total assets, ∆RECit is 
the change in accounts receivable (data 2) lagged by total assets and PPEit is net property, plant 
and equipment (data 7) scaled by lagged total assets.  I classify firm-years into industries based 
on the classification scheme used in Barth et al. (1998) and Barth et al. (2005).  I estimate 
performance-matched discretionary accruals (PMDACC) as the difference between each 
observation’s discretionary accrual measure and the median discretionary accrual measure for its 
ROA and industry decile, where medians are calculated excluding the observation.  H1 predicts 
that aggressive financial reporting firms are more likely to engage in aggressive tax reporting; 
therefore I expect β1 to be positive. 
While I expect PMDACC to capture firms with a tendency to report aggressively for 
financial statement purposes, PMDACC does not directly measure the underlying reasons why 
those firms engage in aggressive financial reporting.  The earnings management literature posits a 
number of motivations for aggressive financial reporting, including pressure to meet benchmarks, 
pressure from analysts, poor corporate governance and excessive executive compensation.  In 
untabulated regressions described below I include proxies for some of these underlying 
motivations for aggressive financial reporting, but I do not find significant results.   
Prior research indicates that firms are penalized for an earnings decrease after a string of 
consecutive earnings increases (Barth et al. 1999) and for missing earnings after consecutively 
 
32 Referencing COMPUSTAT data items, TA = (∆data 4 - ∆data 1 - ∆data 5 + ∆data 34 – data 14)/lagged 
data 6. 
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meeting/beating analysts’ forecasts (Bartov et al. 2002; Kasznik and McNichols 2002).  
Following Frank et al. (2006), I try to capture these incentives to engage in aggressive financial 
reporting by including INC_EPS, a variable equal to the number of consecutive years the firm has 
reported earnings increases over the prior five years and, POS_AFE, a variable equal to the 
number of consecutive years the firm has meet/beat analysts’ forecasts over the prior five years.  
Neither variable is significant in the model.  I attribute the lack of significance to measurement 
error; given the time frame of my COLI observations, the data necessary to construct a variable 
from the five years prior to adoption is difficult to obtain.  I do not focus on firms who are close 
to earnings benchmarks in the year of shelter adoption because, unlike manipulating accruals, 
investing in a complex tax shelter like COLI is not an earnings management strategy that can be 
employed close to the end of the reporting period to temporarily boost earnings.33
Prior studies link aggressive financial reporting to poor corporate governance.  For 
example, Dechow et al. (1996) find that firms subject to SEC enforcement actions are more likely 
to have boards of directors dominated by management, more likely to have a CEO who is also the 
Chairman of the board, and less likely to have audit committees or outside blockholders.  Klein 
(2002) finds that abnormal accruals are negatively related to audit committee and board 
independence.  I include a commonly used measure of corporate governance, the g-index 
(Gompers et al. 2003), in the model but do not find significant results.  Again, I attribute the lack 
of significance to measurement error.  The g-index is a composite measure of corporate 
governance and may not be a good proxy for the governance issues likely associated with 
 
33 Studies of capital market reasons for earnings management also show that managers overstate earnings 
prior to equity offerings (Teo, Welch, and Wong 1998) and stock-financed acquisitions (Erickson and 
Wang 1998).  The planning time frame for these events may be long enough to make investing in a tax 
shelter a feasible strategy for increasing financial income.  I leave the examination of the association 
between earnings management in anticipation of capital market transactions and tax sheltering for future 
research.  
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aggressive financial or tax reporting.  Furthermore, the availability of the g-index is severely 
limited in earlier years.  I leave examination of association between tax sheltering and specific 
measure of corporate governance, like board independence, to future research.  
Finally, prior studies suggest that earnings management may be linked to executive 
compensation.  For example, Matsunaga and Park (2001) find that CEOs’ cash bonuses are 
negatively impacted when the firm’s quarterly earnings fall short of the consensus analyst 
forecast and interpret their findings as evidence that CEOs have economics incentives to meet 
analysts’ forecasts.  Aboody and Kasznik (2000) find that CEOs make opportunistic voluntary 
disclosures to maximize their stock option compensation.  I include the Black-Scholes value of 
the CEO’s stock grants as a measure of the CEO’s incentive to manage earnings, but do not find 
that this measure is significant in the model.34  Since stock-based compensation may not have 
been as prevalent in the early part of my sample period, an examination of the relation between 
cash salaries or bonuses and tax sheltering may be fruitful area for future research. 
  
4.2.3 H2 Explanatory Variables
To test H2, I include four variables that proxy for firms’ non-COLI tax savings 
opportunities: D_RD, CAPINT, INTANG, and FOREIGN.  Firms with different types of assets, 
liabilities, revenues and expenses face different opportunities to avoid taxes, so that one shelter is 
not applicable to all firms.  The relation between participation in a particular shelter and the 
firm’s alternative tax savings opportunities is unclear.  Anecdotal evidence from tax shelter 
marketers indicates the existence of a set of aggressive firms willing to invest in multiple shelters 
to maintain lower ETRs, suggesting a positive relation between COLI participation and other tax 
                                                 
34 Execucomp data on stock compensation is first available for 1992.  For years before 1992, I set 
the variable equal to the 1992 value. 
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avoidance opportunities.  On the other hand, COLI participants may feel pressured to invest in 
this particular shelter because they face limited alternatives to lower their ETRs, suggesting a 
negative relation between COLI participation and alternative tax avoidance opportunities.  
Compared to other codified and shelter-related tax savings strategies involving specific types of 
assets, liabilities, income and expenses, COLI can be used by a broad set of firms.  Therefore, I 
expect negative coefficients for D_RD, CAPINT, INTANG, and FOREIGN.   
Firms with significant foreign operations have more opportunities and incentives to 
engage in tax planning activities (Desai et al. 2007; Rego 2003).  Many recent tax shelters exploit 
jurisdictional differences in the tax rules and tax rates; however, the mechanics of the COLI 
shelter make it feasible for both multinational and domestic-only firms.   Thus, I expect firms 
with significant foreign operations are less likely to use COLI shelters.  Following Rego (2003), I 
measure the extent of a firm’s foreign operations as the ratio of foreign assets to total assets.  I 
obtain foreign assets from the geographic segment data files in COMPUSTAT. 
Firms heavily engaged in research and development have several tax savings 
opportunities, including the ability to shift intellectual property rights and royalty income to low-
tax jurisdictions and codified tax breaks such as the R&D tax credit.  Furthermore, the use of 
stock option compensation is highly correlated with R&D activity, and until recently stock 
options represented a significant tax but not book expense.  Given these alternative tax savings 
opportunities, I expect R&D-intensive firms to be less likely to engage in a tax shelter like 
COLI.35  I include two measures of R&D-related tax avoidance opportunities.  The first, 
D_RDt-1, is an indicator variable equal to one if the ratio of R&D expense to sales in the prior 
year (RDt-1) is positive and zero otherwise.  The second is the ratio of intangible assets to total 
 
35 That is not to say that these firms are not engaged in tax shelters.  Graham and Tucker (2006) include 
firms with deficiencies related to transfer pricing in their tax shelter sample.  R&D firms are likely 
candidates for aggressive transfer pricing activities. 
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assets in the prior year (INTANGt-1).  I expect the coefficients on these measures to be negative.  I 
include the prior year’s ratio of net property, plant and equipment to total assets (CAPINTt-1) to 
control for tax preferences associated with capital investments (Gupta and Newberry 1997).  I 
expect the coefficient on CAPINT to be negative. 
H2 predicts that firms with fewer alternative tax savings opportunities will be more likely 
to adopt the tax shelter.  I view RD, CAPINT, INTANG, and FOREIGN as collectively capturing 
the firm’s non-COLI tax avoidance strategy set and expect each of these to be a substitute for the 
COLI shelter.  While I expect the coefficients on all of these variables to be negative, two 
possibilities could give rise to mixed results.  First, if some, but not all of these variables capture 
COLI substitutes, only those that are truly substitutes will have negative coefficients.  Second, the 
variables I use to proxy for the firm’s alternative tax savings opportunities could capture other 
constructs.  For example, RD is often thought of as a measure of the manager’s willingness to 
take on risky projects. 
 
4.2.4 H3 Explanatory Variables 
To test H3, I initially include three proxies for firms’ reputation concerns: VOL, NINST, 
and ANALYST.  Firms with more visibility in the capital markets should have a greater incentive 
to avoid the appearance of impropriety associated with involvement in tax shelters.  Prior 
research indicates that institutional investors often act as additional monitors, exercising 
discipline over management (Hartzell and Starks 2003; Bushee and Noe 2000).  Thus, I expect 
managers to be more concerned about accusations of tax shelter involvement when institutional 
ownership is high.  Institutional holdings are available from Thompson Financial on a quarterly 
basis.  I measure NINSTt-1 as the number of institutions holding the firm’s stock averaged across 
the four quarters in year t-1 and expect the coefficient on this variable to be negative. 
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Initially, I included BLOCKt-1, the fraction of shares held by five-percent blockholders 
averaged across the four quarters in year t-1 and expected the coefficient on this variable to be 
negative.  Results were not significant.  However, rather than having higher values for firms with 
greater information asymmetry and thus greater reputational concerns, BLOCK likely has higher 
values when information asymmetry is low because a few large shareholders hold most of the 
firm, are likely close to management and rely less on management’s external reports for their 
assessment of the firm.36
Analysts affect the firm’s reputation by focusing investor attention on potential risks.  
When analyst coverage is high, news about the firm is quickly dispersed to a broad set of 
investors.  Thus, I expect managers of firms with high analyst following to be more sensitive to 
reputational concerns.  I measure analyst coverage as the number of analysts included in the most 
recent consensus forecast of annual earnings on I/B/E/S (ANALYST) and expect the coefficient on 
this variable to be negative.  Finally, I include average trading volume (VOL) as an additional 
proxy for the firm’s capital market visibility.  Like analyst coverage, I expect firms with greater 
capital market visibility to be more sensitive to reputational concerns.  Thus, I expect a negative 
coefficient on VOL. 
 
4.2.5 Additional Control Variables 
Section 4.1.3 details the construction of three different control samples.  I use a matched 
control design to control for non-equivalence between the COLI and non-COLI firms at a broad 
level.  Limiting the sample based on asset size, as opposed to simply including size as a 
continuous control variable in the regression model, is essential.  Size is highly correlated with 
                                                 
36 I appreciate discussion with Partha Sengupta, who brought this issue to my attention. 
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many of my variables of interest and if I control for size by including it as a continuous control 
variable, the explanatory power of my other variables of interest would be dominated by the 
explanatory power of firm size.  I include MTB, lnASSETS, and lnEMP as continuous control 
variables to make the results from estimating Eq. (1) using the three different control samples 
more comparable.  I include ROA, MTR and REL_ETR to control for other factors likely to affect 
the probability of COLI shelter adoption.  I discuss the rationale for these control variables in the 
following paragraphs.   
Foremost, tax shelters decrease taxes due.  Firms with NOL carryfowards or negative pre-
tax income are less likely to owe taxes currently, thus less likely to invest in the COLI shelter.  I 
include a trichotomous variable (MTRt-1) equal to zero if the firm reported a positive net operating 
loss (NOL) carryforward balance and negative pre-tax income in the prior year, one if the firm 
reported either an NOL carryfoward balance or negative pre-tax income in the prior year and two 
if the firm reported zero NOL carryfowards and positive pre-tax income in the prior year (Mills et 
al. 2003). I expect MTRt-1 to be negatively related to COLI participation.  To control for 
differences in profitability, I include prior year’s return on assets (ROAt-1) and expect this 
measure to be positively related to COLI participation.  Prior research suggests that high-growth 
firms face greater incentives to meet financial reporting benchmarks (Skinner and Sloan 2002).  I 
control for differences in growth opportunities by including the prior year’s ratio of market equity 
to book value (MTBt-1) and expect a positive coefficient on this measure. 
Poor performance, relative to benchmarks based on past performance or industry 
averages, increases corporate risk taking (Bromiley 1991).  Treasury’s report (1999) cites 
pressure to keep ETRs low and in line with competitors as a potential driving force behind the 
spread of corporate tax shelter activity.  In Forbes’ (1998) cover story on tax shelters, a tax 
shelter promoter was quoted as saying, “A potential client once said he would hire the firm if we 
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could get their tax rate down, because it was higher than their competitors' and they were 
embarrassed" (Novack and Saunders). Firms whose ETRs are high relative to their competitors 
may be more likely to engage in aggressive tax shelter activity to meet industry benchmarks.  
Alternatively, firms may resort to riskier tax avoidance activities to maintain low ETRs when 
alternative, less aggressive tax avoidance opportunities have already been exhausted.   
I control for a firm’s incentive to keep its ETR in-line with competitors by including 
(REL_ETRt), the average difference between the firm’s ETR and the statutory rate over the prior 
five years (REL_STR5yr) minus the median value of REL_STR5yr for firms in the same industry.  
Annual ETRs are highly variable year-to-year, and in the cross-section ETRs vary by industry 
and profitability.37  I am interested in controlling for the firm’s incentive to decrease their ETR 
generally as well as the firm’s incentive to match its ETR to peer benchmarks.  Thus, I construct a 
measure of the firm’s long-term ability to keep its ETR low and in-line with competitors.   By 
construction, REL_ETR is highest for firms who maintain ETRs below the statutory rate and 
below the median ETR for their industry.38  A negative coefficient on REL_ETR suggests that 
firms engage in aggressive tax avoidance to meet competitor benchmarks, while a positive 
coefficient on REL_ETR is consistent with firms engaging in tax shelter activity to sustain an 
already low string of prior ETRs. 
Finally, the mechanics of broad-based, leveraged COLI make this particular shelter most 
profitable for firms with large workforces.  For example, Wal-Mart purchased COLI policies on 
approximately 350,000 of its employees (Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. AIG Life Ins. Co., No. 126, 
 
37 Dyreng et al. (2008) develop a measure of long-run tax avoidance based on cash taxes paid.  
Unfortunately, the data necessary to calculate their measure is unavailable during the time period of this 
study. 
38 Untabulated results using a variety of alternative measures including a five-year firm ETR and the 
industry-median adjusted ETR for t-1 are qualitatively similar. 
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2004 (Del. Nov. 4, 2004).  To control for this COLI-specific requirement, I include the log of the 
number of employees in the prior year (lnEMPt-1) and expect a positive coefficient. 
 
4.3 Model Limitations 
Section 4.1.3 describes one potential selection issue; because shelter use is difficult to 
detect, my control samples may include firms who participated in the COLI shelter but whose 
participation was unobservable.  This type of selection problem is referred to as incidental 
truncation and arises when observation of the dependent variable is dependent on another 
variable.  In this case, observation of COLI participation depends on disclosure or detection of 
COLI involvement.  As I explain in Section 4.1.1, one advantage of my sample, relative to the 
samples used in other recent research, is that I am able to identify both tax shelter participants 
whose activities were detected by the IRS and those who came forward voluntarily.  Nonetheless, 
incidental truncation is still an issue.  I use a one-to-many match to reduce the influence of 
incorrectly coding the COLI indicator variable as a zero, rather than a one. 
The other primary model misspecification concern in Eq. (1) is an omitted variable.  
H1-H3 posit that certain firm characteristics will affect he probability of adopting the COLI 
shelter.  Treasury and the business press have emphasized the role of tax shelter promoters in the 
rise of corporate tax shelter activity.  I focus on the demand side of the tax shelter industry and do 
not measure the potential impact of the supply side of the industry.  Tax shelter promoters may 
have developed predictions similar to those in H1-H3 and targeted potential clients accordingly.  
Assume that the more a firm is targeted by tax shelter promoters the more likely that firm is to 
adopt the COLI shelter.  If the explanatory variables in Eq. (1) are positively correlated with the 
likelihood of being targeted by a tax shelter promoter, my coefficient estimates will likely be 
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biased.  Thus, the coefficients derived from estimating Eq. (1) may overstate the effect of the 
explanatory variables on the probability of participating in the COLI shelter.  
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Chapter 5 – Results and Interpretation 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Results 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for both the COLI and control samples, measured 
in year t.  The average COLI firm has total assets of $3.7 billion and net sales of $4.3 billion, 
while the average Control Group A firm has total assets of $1.7 billion and net sales of $1.9 
billion.  Although I construct Control Group A by matching on total assets in year t-1, the average 
COLI firm is more than twice the size of the average Control Group A firm.  However, average 
total assets for Control Groups B and C are more similar, suggesting that COLI sample firms are 
the largest firms in their industries.  Consistent with H1, COLI firms have significantly (p<0.05) 
higher performance-matched discretionary accruals (PMDACC) compared to Control Groups A 
and C.  The average COLI firm has positive PMDACC of 0.009, while the average PMDACC  is 
-0.007 for Control Group A and -0.006 for Control Group C.  The difference in PMDACC  
between the COLI sample and Control Group B is not significant. 
 REL_ETR compares the firm’s ETR over the prior five years to both the statutory rate 
and to the median ETR for the firm’s industry.  Higher values of REL_ETR indicate that a firm 
consistently reports an ETR lower than the statutory rate and lower than the industry median.  
The mean REL_ETR for the COLI sample is 0.028 while the mean REL_ETR for the Control 
Group A is 0.011.  Mean values of REL_ETR indicate COLI firms report lower ETRs than their 
industry peers, despite the fact that COLI firms are more profitable during the prior year (ROAt-1) 
than control firms.  However, the mean difference in REL_ETR is not statistically significant. 
The percentage of sample firms with R&D expenditures is greater for the COLI sample 
(47.7%) than for any of the control samples (29.3%, 36.2% and 44.2%).  However, only Control 
Group A is statistically less R&D intensive (p<0.05).  The median value of D_RDt-1 is 0.000 for 
all four samples reflecting the large number of missing observations in COMPUSTAT during the 
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sample period for R&D that I set equal to zero.  The median value of FOREIGNt-1 is also 0.000 
for all four samples.  Since I require that all sample firms have non-missing data on 
COMPUSTAT’s geographic segment tapes, median values equal to 0.000 indicate that the 
majority of COLI and control sample firms do not have significant foreign operations.  Firms in 
Control Groups B and C have significantly higher FOREIGNt-1 relative to COLI firms (0.079 vs. 
0.129 and 0.128), but the difference in FOREIGNt-1 between COLI and Control Group A is not 
significant, suggesting that COLI adopters are concentrated in industries with less opportunities 
for foreign operations.  
Consistent with H3, the average COLI firm has significantly lower trading volume than 
each of Control Groups A, B and C (2.494 vs. 3.092, 3.517, and 3.657), suggesting that COLI 
adopters have lower capital market visibility.  Except compared to Control Group B, which is 
constructed by matching on the number of employees, the average COLI firm has a significantly 
larger workforce than the average control firm (lnEMPt-1 = 2.493 vs. 1.944 for Group A and 2.160 
for Group C), reflecting the relationship between the size of a firm’s workforce and its potential 
benefit from investing in a COLI shelter.   
The univariate results in Table 2 vary across the control samples.  To better understand 
the how differences in incentives, opportunities and costs affect firms’ decisions to adopt a tax 
shelter, I estimate a multivariate, cross-sectional logistic model separately using each of the 
control samples. 
 
5.2 Cross-Sectional Logit Results
Table 3 reports results for estimating the cross-sectional logit (Eq. 1) using Control 
Group A.  The columns labeled “Full Sample” (n=460) show results of estimating the model 
without including NINST and ANALYST, and the columns labeled “Restricted Sample” (n=303) 
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show results of estimating the complete cross-sectional logit model for all COLI and Control 
Group A firms with required data available in I/B/E/S and Thompson Financial.  The regression 
results indicate that both models have reasonable explanatory power with McFadden’s pseudo R2 
values equal to 11.75 percent and 15.39 percent.  Table 3 also reports results of a likelihood ratio 
test of the hypothesis that all coefficients except the intercept are equal to zero.  The chi-squared 
statistics reported, 34.102 for the full sample and 31.452 for the restricted sample, indicate that 
both models are reasonably well-fitted.39  Robust standard errors are estimated using the Huber 
(1967)-White (1980) procedure.  I begin with a discussion of the results for estimating Eq. (1) for 
the full sample. 
The coefficient on PMDACC is positive and significant (4.641, χ2=4.28), supporting H1.  
The marginal effect indicates that, holding D_RDt-1 = 0 and all other variables at their median 
values, a one standard deviation increase in PMDACC is associated with a 34 percent (from 5.9 
percent to 7.9 percent) increase in the probability that a firm will adopt a COLI shelter.  Firms 
with higher discretionary accruals are more likely to adopt a COLI shelter, suggesting a link 
between aggressive financial and aggressive tax reporting.  Results for PMDACC are consistent 
with Frank et al. (2006) who find that firms that have more aggressive financial reporting tend to 
have more aggressive tax reporting, using discretionary accruals and discretionary permanent 
book-tax differences to proxy for aggressive reporting. 
Results for H2 are mixed.  The coefficient on D_RDt-1 (1.240, χ2=9.92) is positive, rather 
than negative as predicted.  In fact, the marginal effect indicates that a change in D_RDt-1 from a 
value of zero to a value of one, holding all other variables at their median values, more than 
doubles (from 6.8 percent to 20 percent) the probability that a firm will adopt a COLI shelter.  
 
39 For the full sample, the Hosmer and Lemeshow goodness-of-fit χ2 equals 11.53 with a p-value for a 
null hypothesis equal to 0.17.  Thus the HL test also indicates that the model is reasonably well-
fitted. 
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The coefficients on CAPINTt-1 (-0.652, χ2=0.27) and INTANGt-1 (-3.144, χ2=1.59) are negative but 
not significant.  Consistent with H2, the coefficient on FOREIGNt-1 is negative and significant 
(-2.798, χ2=6.40).  Firms with greater foreign assets are less likely to adopt the COLI shelter, 
suggesting that firms with greater opportunities to avoid taxation by shifting income to lower-tax 
jurisdictions are less likely to use the COLI shelter to obtain tax savings.  The marginal effect 
indicates that, holding D_RDt-1 = 0 and all other variables at their median values, a one standard 
deviation increase in FOREIGNt-1  is associated with a 36 percent (from 8.5 percent to 5.4 
percent) decrease in the probability that a firm will adopt a COLI shelter. 
Results for the control variables are also mixed.  The coefficients on MTBt-1 and MTRt-1 
are negative but not significant.  The coefficients on lnEMPt-1 and REL_ETR are positive but not 
significant.  The coefficient on ROAt-1 is positive and significant (3.252, χ2=1.93), consistent with 
more profitable firms having more potential tax liability to shelter  
In the full sample specification, I include VOL to proxy for the firm’s capital market 
visibility and reputational concerns.  Results for VOL (-0.130, χ2=2.25) support H3 and suggest 
that managers with greater reputational concerns are less likely to adopt a tax shelter that 
shareholders might find objectionable.  In terms of the marginal effect holding D_RDt-1 = 0 and 
all other variables at their median values, a one standard deviation increase in VOL is associated 
with a 27 percent (from 7.9 percent to 5.8 percent) decrease in the probability that a firm will 
adopt a COLI shelter.  I include two additional measures for managers’ reputational concerns, the 
number of institutions holding the firm’s stock (NINST) and the number of analysts covering the 
firm (ANALYST).  Like VOL, I expect the coefficients on these measures to be negative.  
However, as Table 3 shows, using a restricted sample, the coefficients on NINST and ANALYST 
are not significant.  Furthermore, all else equal, COLI firms appear to be held by more 
institutions, not less.  While results for VOL support H3, the coefficients on NINST and ANALYST 
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are not significant.  Results for the other variables of interest are qualitatively similar using both 
the full sample and the restricted sample. 
One possible explanation for the mixed H2 results in Table 3 (Control Group A) is that 
matching on industry limits variation in the variables of interest: D_RDt-1, CAPINTt-1, INTANGt-1, 
and FOREIGNt-1.  To capture differences in these variables between COLI participants and non-
participants, I form two additional control samples that are not dependent on industry matching, 
Control Groups B and C.  Table 4 reports results using Control Group B, and Table 5 reports 
results using Control Group C.  The regression sample used in Table 3 includes 44 COLI firms, 
but the regression samples used in Tables 4 and 5 include only 43 COLI firms.  One COLI firm is 
dropped when the procedures used to construct Control Groups B and C do not result in a match 
for that firm.    
In Tables 4 and 5, the columns labeled “Full Sample” show results of estimating the 
model without including NINST and ANALYST, and the columns labeled “Restricted Sample” 
show results of estimating the complete cross-sectional logit model for all COLI and control firms 
with required data available in I/B/E/S and Thompson Financial.  The full sample using Control 
Group B consists of 444 firm-year observations, and the restricted sample using Control Group B 
consists of 293 firm-year observations.  The full sample using Control Group C consists of 423 
firm-year observations, and the restricted sample using Control Group C consists of 268 firm-year 
observations.  Compared to Table 3, the pseudo R2 values in Tables 4 and 5 are lower, indicating 
that the model is best specified when the matching procedure controls for industry.  
Overall, the results in Tables 4 and 5 are similar to those in Table 3, demonstrating that 
the results are not sensitive to the use of a particular control sample.  As in Table 3, the results in 
Tables 4 and 5 tend to support H1.  In three of four specifications, the coefficient on PMDACC is 
positive and significant, providing additional evidence that aggressive tax reporting is linked to 
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aggressive financial reporting.  Likewise the results for H3 are consistent across the three control 
samples.  For the full sample specifications, the coefficients on VOL are negative and significant 
in both Table 4 (-0.201, χ2=3.88) and Table 5 (-0.192, χ2=3.12).  As in Table 3, the coefficients on 
NINST are positive, rather than negative as predicted.  The coefficient on ANALYST is negative 
and significant (-0.083, χ2=3.03) in Table 5 but not significant in either Table 3 or 4.   
Although I construct Control Groups B and C without reference to industry, Tables 4 and 
5 show mixed results for H2 similar to Table 3.  The coefficients on FOREIGNt-1 are negative and 
significant in both Table 4 (-3.782, χ2=8.58) and Table 5 (-3.538, χ2=6.20), indicating again that 
COLI firms are characterized by low foreign operations.  In all three tables, the coefficients on 
D_RDt-1 are positive, rather than negative as predicted.  I hypothesize that firms with fewer 
alternative tax savings opportunities, proxied by lower R&D expenditures, would be more likely 
to engage in the COLI shelter; however, the results suggest that COLI participation is associated 
with higher R&D intensity.  While inconsistent with my hypothesis, a positive relation between 
R&D and tax shelter use is consistent with Graham and Tucker (2006).  The coefficient on 
INTANGt-1 is negative and significant for the full sample in Table 5 but is not significant in any of 
the other specifications. 
Overall, the evidence in Tables 3, 4 and 5 suggests that COLI participation is associated 
with higher performance-matched discretionary accruals, the presence of R&D expenditures, 
lower foreign operations and higher trading volume.  Taken together, the results support H1, but 
provide mixed evidence regarding H2 and H3. 
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5.3 Supplementary Analyses 
5.3.1 Disclosure of COLI Activity 
 Conventional wisdom holds that the tax shelter industry is very secretive; tax shelters are 
designed to hide income from the IRS, many recent shelters were sold with confidentiality 
agreements and shelter promoters are reticent to disclose their clients.  However, of the 44 firms 
that comprise my COLI sample, 31 disclose their participation, concurrent with their use of the 
shelter, in their financial statements.  Bankman (2002) offers one explanation for this behavior: 
 “Companies that purchase shelters convince themselves that they are doing 
nothing wrong and have a winning case under a literalist reading of the statue.  
Adding a cloak works against this mindset: A company that decides a cloak is 
necessary is a company that is more likely than not to forego the shelter 
(p. 458).” 
 
 In my main results, I examine firm characteristics of COLI participants relative to non-
COLI firms, but among COLI firms, I do not distinguish between disclosers and non-disclosers.  
Firms who invest in COLI and choose to openly disclose their use of COLI likely differ from 
those firms who invest in COLI but only reveal their investment when forced to do so.  Most 
importantly, those firms who invest and openly disclose may feel strongly that COLI is a 
legitimate tax planning strategy.  H1 predicts that some firms have an overall tendency to engage 
in aggressive corporate reporting.  A disclosing firm’s belief that COLI is a legitimate strategy 
rather than an aggressive tax avoidance strategy should bias against finding results for H1.  
Similarly, H3 predicts that firms with greater reputational concerns will be less likely to invest in 
COLI and may not hold for firms that openly disclose their COLI involvement.  H2 predicts that 
firms with fewer alternative tax savings opportunities will be more likely to invest in COLI.  I 
expect this hypothesis to apply to both disclosing and non-disclosing COLI participants.   
My sample includes all firms whose shelter activity is observable.  Tax shelter activity is 
observable if either a) the firm is a disclosing firm, b) the firm is a non-disclosing firm whose 
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activity is revealed ex post when detected by regulators, or c) the firm is a non-disclosing firm 
whose activity is revealed ex post when the firm comes forward for the COLI amnesty program.  
Tax shelter activity is generally not observable for non-disclosing firms whose activities are not 
detected by regulators.  Thus, selection bias could be an issue for my sample.  Non-disclosing 
firms are likely under-represented relative to the true population of non-disclosing firms.  Ideally, 
I would model the decision to participate in COLI and the decision to disclose that participation 
separately.  Unfortunately the small size of my sample does not make that feasible.  Instead, I 
offer some descriptive statistics on disclosers and non-disclosers. 
Table 6 shows additional descriptive statistics for disclosers and non-disclosers, 
measured in year t-1.  On average, non-disclosers are larger than disclosers; non-disclosers have 
mean assets of $6.402 billion relative to disclosers whose mean assets are $1.988 billion 
(t-statistic = 1.92).  Non-disclosers also have greater analyst coverage (ANALYST = 15.231 vs. 
6.774, t-statistic = 2.37) and more institutional shareholders (NINST = 208.59 vs. 84.5, t-statistic 
= 2.08).  Although the percentage of shares held by institutional shareholders is not significantly 
different between the two groups, the percentage of shares held by block shareholders is 
significantly lower for non-disclosers than for disclosers (BLOCKRATIO = 0.032 vs. 0.075, 
t-statistic =-1.90).  Together, sample means for NINST, NBLOCK, IORATIO and 
BLOCKRATIO indicate that non-disclosers are more broadly held by institutions but less of their 
institutional ownership is concentrated in the hands of large blockholders.  Interestingly, the 
measure of reputational costs that has significant explanatory power in the multivariate model, 
VOL, does not significantly vary between disclosing COLI firms and non-disclosing COLI firms.    
 In summarizing statistics for the full COLI sample, Panel A, I set null observations of 
ANALYST, NINST, NBLOCK, IORATIO and BLOCKRATIO equal to zero.  Panel B provides 
summary statistics for 22 disclosers and 10 non-disclosers with non-missing data from I/B/E/S 
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and Thompson Financial.  Inferences from the restricted sample are consistent with those for the 
full sample. 
 
5.3.2 Comparisons of COLI and Control Firms Over Time 
 Figures 2A, 2B, 2C and 2D depict the time trends before and after shelter adoption in 
four variables, LEVERAGE, ETR, PMDACC and PERMDIFF.  These graphs are constructed 
using a sample of 37 COLI firms and 262 firms from Control Group A with all data required to 
compute LEVERAGE, ETR, PMDACC and PERMDIFF every year from year t-4 to year t+4.  
Figure 2A shows that relative to control firms, COLI firms have significantly lower LEVERAGE 
both before and after adopting the COLI shelter (p-value < 0.05 in a one-tailed t-test for each time 
period).  This evidence is consistent with Graham and Tucker (2006) who find that, holding all 
else equal in a logistic regression, shelter firms are less likely to issue debt.  Graham and Tucker 
(2006) also find that relative to firms matched on pre-shelter activity debt ratios, shelter firms’ 
debt ratios fall by 8% following adoption of the shelter.  In contrast, Figure 2A suggests that 
relative to industry and size-matched firms, shelter firms have lower debt ratios even several 
years prior to adopting a shelter.   
 Treasury’s (1999) white paper suggests that firms engage in tax shelters under pressure to 
keep their ETRs low and in line with competitor benchmarks.  If so, relative to control firms, I 
would expect COLI firms to have higher ETRs before adopting the shelter and lower ETRs after 
adopting the shelter.  Figure 2B shows some evidence of this flip in average ETRs around the 
time that COLI firms start using the shelter, however, the difference in mean ETR between COLI 
and non-COLI firms is not significant in any of the years t-4  to t+4 (p-value for a two-tailed 
t-test is always > 0.10).   
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If shelter firms have an overall tendency toward aggressive corporate behavior which 
simultaneously impacts financial earnings management activity and tax sheltering, I would expect 
these firms to have higher PMDACC in general, not just in the year of shelter adoption.  
However, Figure 2C shows that COLI firms do not have consistently higher levels of PMDACC.  
Relative to control firms, COLI firms have significantly higher PMDACC in year t-4 (t-statistic = 
1.99), significantly lower PMDACC in year t-3 (t-statistic = -2.01) and significantly higher 
PMDACC in year t (t-statistic = 2.76).  The mean difference in PMDACC between COLI and 
Control firms is not statistically significant in any of the other years.   
Large book-tax differences are often equated with aggressive tax reporting.  However, large 
book-tax differences can also arise because of mechanical differences in the rules used to 
calculate book and taxable income or aggressive financial earnings management.  To date, there 
is no strong evidence to validate the use of book-tax differences as a proxy for tax shelter activity 
(Shevlin 2002).  Figure 2D offers some validation by comparing the book-tax differences from a 
sample of known tax shelter participants to those from a matched sample. 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, recent corporate tax shelters were designed to decrease taxable 
income without decreasing book income, and the ideal shelter produces a permanent book-tax 
difference.  Unlike temporary differences, which eventually reverse over time, permanent 
differences represent income (expenses) for financial (tax) purposes which will never be recorded 
for tax (financial) purposes.  I calculate permanent differences, PERMDIFF, following Frank et 
al. (2006) as the difference between book income and taxable income, deflated by assets at the 
beginning of the year (lag data 6).  Book income equals pretax income (data 170) less minority 
(data 49), and taxable income equals the sum of current federal tax expense (data 63) and current 
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foreign tax expense (data 64), divided by the statutory tax rate, less deferred taxes (data 50), 
deflated by the statutory tax rate.40   
Figure 2D shows that relative to control firms, COLI firms have significantly higher 
PERMDIFF in every year except year t+1 (one-tailed t-tests each have p-value < 0.10).    While 
this evidence indicates that shelter users have relatively larger book-tax differences, it does not 
rule out the possibility that these larger book-tax differences might also be driven by more 
aggressive financial reporting.  Furthermore, using discretionary book-tax differences to proxy 
for tax shelter use remains problematic because as Shevlin (2002) points out, the variables used to 
explain the non-discretionary portion of book-tax differences, like profitability and firm size, are 
also likely variables that explain the firm’s decision to use a tax shelter. 
 
5.3.3 Alternative Proxies for Reputational Concern
My initial three proxies for reputational concerns are based on the premise that firms with 
greater capital market visibility will be more concerned about damage to their reputations and less 
likely to engage in aggressive behavior than those with less visibility.  However, my sample firms 
are all relatively large and well-covered by financial intermediaries.  Moreover, as discussed in 
Section 3.3, there is no clear a priori reason that shareholders themselves would find managers’ 
aggressive corporate tax reports objectionable.  Therefore, I consider three additional measures of 
reputational concern designed to differentiate those firms which are highly visible to the public in 
general because managers of more visible firms should be concerned about the negative publicity 
of being associated with tax shelter use.   
                                                 
40 When data 63 is missing, current federal tax expense is calculated as (data 16 – data 64 – data 173 – data 
50). 
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First, I construct a measure of press coverage, PRESS, equal to the number of distinct press 
articles published about the firm for the two-year period, January 1, t-1 through December 31, t, 
in Factiva’s database of major U.S. news and business publications.  Following Barton (2005), I 
only count an article if the firm’s name appears in the headline or lead paragraph and the article is 
not a republished article or a recurring pricing/market data news item.  I expect managers of more 
visible firms to be more concerned about negative publicity associated with tax shelter scandal; 
therefore I expect a negative coefficient on PRESS.   
Second, I expect managers of firms with valuable brand names, especially retailers, to be 
more concerned about potential customer backlash if the firm is revealed to have participated in a 
tax shelter and is labeled a poor corporate citizen.  Consistent with this idea, Hanlon and Slemrod 
(2007) find weak evidence that the negative market reaction to news of tax shelter involvement is 
greater for retail firms.  I include RETAIL, an indicator variable equal to one if the firm is 
associated with a brand listed in Advertising Age’s annual survey of the Top 200 Brands or has an 
SIC code in the range 5000-5999, zero otherwise.  I also expect a negative coefficient on 
RETAIL.  
Finally, I consider using the firm’s reputation score from Fortune’s American’s Most 
Admired Companies list, published each year, to measure reputational concern.  Since a good 
reputation is valuable and hard to regain once damaged, I expect managers of firms with high 
reputation rankings to be less likely to engage in a tax shelter.  For over three decades, Fortune 
has assigned a reputation score to each of the ten largest firms in more than thirty industries.  The 
reputation score has several components including investor value and corporate social 
responsibility.  Unfortunately, only six firms in the COLI sample appear on the list in 1986, and 
only fourteen firms in the COLI sample appear in 1994.  Thus, the list is not comprehensive 
enough to construct a meaningful measure of reputational concern for my sample. 
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I add PRESS and RETAIL to Eq. (1) and re-estimate the model using Control Group C.  
However, I find that neither the coefficient on PRESS nor the coefficient on RETAIL is 
significant.  PRESS is highly correlated with lnASSETS (ρ = 0.503), but the coefficient on PRESS 
is not significant even when Eq. (1) is estimated without lnASSETS.  Of five separate measures of 
reputational concern, VOL, NINST, ANALYST, PRESS, and RETAIL, only VOL has a negative and 
significant coefficient as predicted. 
In developing H3 I focus on the manager’s desire to protect the firm’s reputation.  
Alternatively, the manager may be reluctant to adopt a tax shelter over concern for his or her 
personal reputation.  For example, well entrenched CEOs or CEOs nearing retirement may be 
more likely to adopt an aggressive tax strategy compared to newly appointed CEOs.  Literature 
on CEO reputation and style suggests that examining the relation between aggressive tax 
reporting and managerial characteristics, as opposed to firm characteristics, may be a more 
powerful setting.  In a current study, Dyreng, Hanlon and Maydew (2007) find that individual 
manager fixed effects have a significant impact on the extent of tax avoidance the firm 
undertakes. 
Bertrand and Schoar (2003), who track top managers across firms and over time, find that 
manager fixed effects are important for a wide range of corporate decisions, including investment 
and financing policies.  Using observable managerial characteristics, Bertrand and Schoar (2003) 
also conclude that executives from earlier birth cohorts appear to be more conservative while 
executives who hold a MBA degree appear to follow more aggressive strategies.  Francis et al. 
(2008) examine the association between CEO reputation and earnings quality.  They find that 
more reputed CEOs are associated with poorer earnings quality relative to less reputed CEOs.  
Francis et al. (2008) interpret their findings as evidence primarily for a matching explanation; 
firms where earnings quality is inherently poor seek reputed CEOs. Milbourn (2003) examines 
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the relation between CEO reputation and stock-based compensation.  His work offers four 
possible observable proxies for CEO reputation: (1) CEO tenure, (2) the number of business-
related articles containing the CEO’s name, (3) whether the CEO is appointed from outside the 
firm, and (4) industry-adjusted firm performance during the CEO’s tenure.   
While the literature on CEO reputation and style suggests methods for testing the 
relationship between managerial characteristics and aggressive tax reporting, it may be difficult to 
determine which top manager is most likely associated with the decision to engage in a tax 
shelter.  I leave an examination of the impact of managerial reputation concerns on aggressive tax 
policy choices for future research. 
 
5.3.4 Early Analysis of Tax Sheltering and Competitive Pressure 
 In preliminary tests, I investigate whether competitive pressure might explain the 
incidence of aggressive tax reporting.  Treasury’s report (1999) emphasizes the pressure to keep 
the firm’s effective tax rate (ETR) low and in line with competitor benchmarks as an explanation 
for the growth in corporate tax shelters.  This competitive pressure could motivate managers to 
invest in increasingly more aggressive tax strategies to obtain and maintain ETRs that are low 
relative to their industry.  I hypothesize that firms in highly competitive industries are more likely 
to engage in aggressive tax reporting.  To examine this hypothesis, I look for an association 
between a Herfindahl-Hirschman (HH) index of industry concentration and several measure of 
tax avoidance.  I construct the HH index by 2-digit SIC code; the HH index is higher for more 
concentrated markets.  I expect the HH index to be negatively related to industry median ETR and 
positively related to industry median PERMDIFF.  However, I find no relation between the HH 
index and these industry measures of tax avoidance.  
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PART II 
Like recent financial accounting scandals, the latest corporate tax shelter boom alarms 
regulators because it signals a shift in the corporate norm toward aggressive reporting.  In 
outlining its concern over the proliferation of tax shelters, Treasury pointed to the following quote 
from the New York Bar Association,  
“The constant promotion of these frequently artificial transactions breeds 
significant disrespect for the tax system, encouraging responsible corporate 
taxpayers to expect this type of activity to be the norm, and to follow the lead of 
other taxpayers who have engaged in tax advantaged transactions (1999, p.3)” 
 
This quote motivates an important question: How does a corporate practice like the use of tax 
shelters spread?  In particular, this quote suggests that: (1) early shelter adopters differ from later 
adopters and (2) later adopters imitate early adopters because they see tax shelter use as the new 
norm.  A quote by Bankman, stemming from his conversations with shelter promoters, also 
suggests that early shelter adopters differ from later adopters,  
“Most companies are reluctant to be the first purchasers, preferring to purchase a 
shelter that has been vetted by others.  On the other hand, since legal reform 
generally has prospective application only, there is a premium to getting a shelter 
early in its life (1999, p.1781)” 
 
The cross-sectional model of tax shelter participation developed in Part I of this study tests 
whether differences in firm-specific characteristics can explain why some firms adopt tax shelters 
and other firms do not.  However, variation in firm characteristics does not directly address how 
aggressive tax reporting became pervasive during the late 1990’s.41  In Part II of this study, I 
examine the spread of COLI activity in two ways.  First, I use theory on the diffusion of strategic 
innovations and institutional isomorphism to develop two additional hypotheses and predict that 
 
41 Indirectly, variation in firm characteristics may explain a rise in aggregate tax shelter activity if the firm 
traits identified as determinants of the likelihood of adopting a shelter characterize an increasing proportion 
of firms over time.  
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factors from the firm’s social environment impact the firm’s decision to adopt the COLI shelter.  
Second, I use event history analysis to investigate the timing of COLI adoptions.
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Chapter 6 – Literature Review 
 To better understand how tax shelter use spread, I draw on a substantial body of literature 
related to the diffusion of innovations and institutional isomorphism.  The literature on diffusion 
encompasses a wide variety of innovations, from the adoption of cell phones to the adoption of 
kindergartens.  Although tax shelters are not typical of the type of practice generally studied in 
the literature, diffusion theory can provide a framework for understanding the recent proliferation 
in corporate tax shelter use.  In addition to covering a wide variety of innovations, diffusion 
studies address a myriad of questions, for example, what characterizes innovators, how 
characteristics of the innovation impact the rate of adoption, and what impacts communication 
channel usage.   
 Rogers (2003) defines diffusion as “the process by which (1) an innovation (2) is 
communicated through certain channels (3) over time (4) among the members of a social system.”  
An innovation can be any new idea or practice.  Certain attributes of an innovation affect its rate 
of adoption.  For example, observability increases the rate of adoption while complexity 
decreases the rate of adoption.  The easier it is for firms to see the results of an innovation, the 
more likely they are to adopt.  On the other hand, innovations that are perceived as difficult and 
complicated to use are adopted more slowly.   
The communication channel is the critical link between prior adopters and potential 
adopters.  Some innovations are communicated quickly through mass media channels while 
others are communicated more slowly through interpersonal channels.  Newness and uncertainty 
make objective evaluation of an innovation’s merits costly.  Thus, while objective evaluation of 
the innovation is important for early adopters, later adopters rely heavily on the subjective 
evaluations of prior adopters.  This reliance links the study of diffusion with the study of 
imitation. 
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The innovation-diffusion process takes place over time, as a firm moves from first 
gaining knowledge of an innovation to forming an attitude toward the innovation to making a 
decision to adopt or reject an innovation (Rogers 2003).  The newness and uncertainty of an 
innovation distinguish the innovation-diffusion process from other types of decision-making.  
Throughout this process, the firm is trying to gain information and reduce uncertainty.  One way 
of reducing the uncertainty surrounding an innovation is to adopt the innovation on a partial basis.  
For example, a firm may try out a new bonus scheme on a select number of employees before 
implementing the scheme company-wide.  When a trial period within the firm is not feasible, trial 
by peers can serve as a substitute (Rogers 2003).  The importance of reducing uncertainty through 
trial is evident in anecdotes gathered by Bankman (1999) who reported the desire among potential 
tax shelter adopters to have the shelter vetted by someone else first. 
Diffusion takes place within a social system which has its own structure and norms.  The 
system’s communication structure can facilitate or impede the diffusion of innovations.  For 
example, in a system with strong opinion leaders, once those opinion leaders adopt an innovation 
many others will adopt quickly thereafter.  Innovations at odds with the current norms of the 
social system will meet more resistance and be adopted more slowly.  Again, unlike other types 
of decision-making, the nature of an innovation-adoption decision requires an understanding of 
the firm’s broader social environment. 
 Unfortunately, studies on the adoption of new business practices do not draw on a single, 
well-defined theory.  The ideas and intuition used to support the hypotheses developed in these 
studies can be traced back to a variety of over-lapping sources.  In addition to theory on the 
diffusion of innovations, a related field of study, institutional isomorphism, tries to explain the 
homogenization of organizational behavior.   
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DiMaggio and Powell (1985) define isomorphism as “a constraining process that forces 
one unit in a population to resemble other units that face the same set of environmental 
conditions.”  They identify threes types of isomorphism: coercive isomorphism, mimetic 
isomorphism and normative isomorphism.  Coercive isomorphism stems from formal and 
informal pressures exerted on an organization by the wider institutions of its environment; for 
example, operating in the same legal and regulatory environment increases homogeneity among 
firms.  Mimetic isomorphism arises because, when faced with uncertainty, organizations tend to 
model themselves on other organizations.  Finally, normative isomorphism refers to the affect of 
professionalization on organizations; organizations draw from the same pool of professionals, 
who have similar norms and dispositions through their shared university and professional training 
and membership in professional organizations.  DiMaggio and Powell (1985) emphasize that their 
typology is an analytic one and that these three types of isomorphism may not be empirically 
distinct. 
Institutional isomorphism, particularly mimetic isomorphism, can help us understand 
how and why new ideas get diffused throughout an environment.  Mimetic isomorphism can be a 
response to uncertainty; when faced with uncertainty, organizations economize on search costs 
and imitate the behavior of other organizations (Cyert and March 1963).  Mimetic isomorphism 
can also occur when a practice becomes institutionalized and legitimized; once enough firms 
adopt a practice, the practice becomes taken-for-granted and remaining firms feel strong pressure 
to join the ranks (March 1981).  Mimetic organizational change can be thought of as a contagion 
process that spreads fashionable practices from one firm to another (Haveman 1993). 
Prior studies on diffusion of business practices and imitation among firms address a wide 
variety of research questions, from how an innovation’s attributes affect its rate of adoption to 
how a firm’s place within its social network impacts the likelihood that firm will eventually 
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adopt.  Likewise, these studies employ a number of different research methods. Within the broad 
literature on diffusion of innovations and institutional isomorphism, I focus on a branch of 
management literature which examines the diffusion of corporate practices.  I am particularly 
interested in two main topics: (1) characteristics of early adopting firms, and (2) the network and 
communication channels through which diffusion occurs.  To give context for the role of theories 
of diffusion and institutional isomorphism in investigating new business practices, I review three 
exemplary studies below. 
Haunschild (1993) examines the influence of inter-organizational imitation on corporate 
acquisition activity.  In particular, she examines whether board interlocks serve as the mechanism 
of imitation.  Haunschild (1993) posits that firm managers who sit on other firms’ boards are 
exposed to the acquisition activities of those firms.  For these managers, the acquisition activities 
of the other firms they are “tied-to” serve as models to imitate.  Consistent with an imitation 
explanation, she finds that the number of current-year acquisitions made by a firm is positively 
related to number of acquisitions made in the prior three years by other firms tied to the firm 
through board directorships, even after controlling for firm-specific determinants of acquisition 
activity tested in prior research.  Haunschild’s (1993) study shows how institutional theory can 
provide a more complete explanation for a wave of corporate behavior, in this instance the 1980s 
wave of mergers and acquisitions, over and above the explanation provided by prevailing theories 
based on firms’ cross-sectional differences. 
In the context of accounting, Mezias (1990) examines the role of institutional theory in 
explaining the financial reporting practices of the Fortune 200, specifically firms’ use of the 
deferral method (DM) versus the flow-through method (FTM) to record investment tax credits.  
He finds that the majority of variance in reporting practice explained by his model is added by 
variables suggested by institutional theory.  Mezias’s (1990) institutional hypotheses are drawn 
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primarily from normative isomorphism rather than mimetic isomorphism; he tests how changes in 
the institutional environment, like the end to the Accounting Principles Board’s prohibition 
against the FTM, affect the probability that a firm adopts a certain reporting practice.  He also 
develops hypotheses based on firm-characteristics designed to capture which firms are more or 
less subject to pressure to achieve isomorphism; for example, Mezias (1990) finds that firms 
experiencing high top management turnover were more likely to conform to prevailing practice 
by adopting the FTM.  Mezias (1990) makes several arguments for the relevance of institutional 
theory in explaining firms’ accounting choices.  In particular, Mezias (1990) points to the role of 
auditors, who, as professionals, serve as an important social link between firms and lend certain 
practices legitimization.  
Rao and Sivakumar (1999) investigate the role of mimetic isomorphism on the diffusion 
of investor relations departments.  From 1984 to 1994, the percentage of Fortune 500 firms with 
investor relations departments rose from 16% to 56%.  Rao and Sivakumar (1999) use the 
diffusion of investor relations departments to test two different models of mimetic pressure, the 
cohesion model and imitation of structurally equivalent firms.  Cohesion models of imitation 
focus on direct ties between firms who have already adopted a practice and firms who have not 
yet adopted a practice.  In contrast, firms may imitate structurally equivalent peers, even in the 
absence of direct ties.  Although structurally equivalent firms are not directly tied to one another, 
they are indirectly tied through their links with a shared environment, for example, ties to the 
same suppliers, customers, or labor unions.  Rao and Sivakumar (1999) find that number of board 
interlocks with prior adopters is significantly and positively related to the likelihood that a firm 
will create an investor relations department, but the number of prior adopters in a firm’s industry 
group does not affect this likelihood.  Their results suggest that the diffusion of investor relations 
departments can be better described by the cohesion model than imitation of structurally 
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equivalent firms.  I follow Rao and Sivakumar (1999) and develop two hypotheses for the role of 
imitation on the diffusion of COLI shelter use, one based on structural equivalence and one based 
on cohesion.
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Chapter 7 – Hypothesis Development  
 Part I of this study investigates the effect of firm characteristics on the likelihood of 
adopting a shelter.  In Part II of this study, I argue that a tax shelter is essentially an innovation, a 
new business practice, which each firm decides to adopt or reject.  My primary research objective 
in Part II is still to explain the firm’s decision to adopt a tax shelter.  However, in this chapter I 
draw on ideas from theory on the diffusion of innovations and institutional isomorphism to 
further explain the firm’s adoption decision.  Putting the firm’s tax shelter adoption decision in 
the context of innovations and how innovations spread gives rise to two questions: (1) do factors 
related to the firm’s social environment and its communication network influence the firm’s 
decision to adopt a shelter, and (2) what factors distinguish early adopters from later adopters?   
 
7.1 Network Influences 
In this section, I develop two hypotheses related to the influence of the firm’s network on 
its decision to adopt a tax shelter.  As detailed in Chapter 6, unlike other decision processes, the 
innovation-decision process is heavily influenced by the firm’s broader social environment.  The 
innovation-decision process has five stages: knowledge, persuasion, decision, implementation and 
confirmation (Rogers 2003).  Since I am primarily interested in explaining the firm’s decision to 
adopt a tax shelter, I focus on the first three stages of the innovation-diffusion process. 
In the knowledge stage, the firm is exposed to the shelter’s existence and gains an 
understanding of how the shelter works.  How does this occur when secrecy surrounds an 
innovation?  First, although conventional wisdom suggests that corporate tax shelters are highly 
secretive, the evidence in Table 6 indicates there was at least some public disclosure of COLI use.  
Second, even absent this public disclosure, knowledge of the shelter could have easily passed to 
potential adopters through interpersonal contacts.  These interpersonal contacts can be direct 
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contacts with prior adopters or indirect contacts with other change agents and aides.  In the case 
of COLI, knowledge may have been transmitted via shared auditors, shared tax advisors, or 
shared legal counsel among others.  
In the persuasion and decision stages, the firm develops either a favorable or unfavorable 
attitude toward the innovation and subsequently chooses to adopt or reject the innovation (Rogers 
2003).  In these two stages, the firm is primarily concerned about reducing the inherent 
uncertainty surrounding an innovation. Given the importance of the subjective evaluations of an 
innovation on a potential adopter’s decision, Rogers (2003) argues that “the heart of the diffusion 
process is the modeling and imitation by potential adopters of their near peers’ experiences with 
the new idea.”  The importance of vicarious trials links diffusion theory with a separately 
developed line of thinking on mimetic isomorphism. 
Together these theories suggest that firms imitate their peers in the adoption of new 
strategies (see Haveman 1993, Haunschild 1993, and Rao and Sivakumar 1999 for example).  
When uncertainty surrounding an innovation is greater, firms are less able to rely on technical 
considerations, increasing the importance of social comparison (Haunschild and Miner 1997; 
Abrahamson and Rosenkopf 1993).  Mimetic isomorphism is a fairly broad term covering several 
different types of imitative behavior, two of which I discuss below. 
Under frequency-based imitation, as more and more firms adopt a practice, the practice 
gains legitimacy.  Eventually, the practice becomes taken-for-granted.  Prior studies investigate 
the role of frequency-based imitation for a wide variety of corporate decisions including: 
adoption of the multidivisional form (Fligstein 1985), adoption of poison pills (Davis 1991), the 
use of a particular investment banker in an acquisition deal (Haunschild and Miner 1997) and the 
creation of investor relations departments (Rao and Sivakumar 1999).  Evidence from these 
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studies is mixed; frequency-based imitation seems to influence some corporate decisions, but not 
others. 
Outcome-imitation theorizes that firms adopt strategies when they observe improvements 
in the performance of peer firms using those strategies (Haunschild and Miner 1997).  
Abrahamson and Rosenkopf (1993) posit that pressures on firms arising from the threat of lost 
competitive advantage produce competitive bandwagons, even when the returns to an innovation 
are unclear.  As the number of adopters in a group increases, non-adopters face the risk of falling 
farther below average if the innovation succeeds.   
Frequency-based imitation is consistent with the anecdotal evidence reported by 
Bankman (1999) and implies that the prevalence of a practice within a community will impact the 
rate of adoption.  Outcome-imitation is consistent with Treasury’s (1999) report, which identifies 
pressure to keep ETRs low and in-line with competitors as a driving force behind the tax shelter 
boom.   
Prior literature provides support for two contagion mechanisms: structural equivalence 
and cohesion (Galaskiewicz and Burt 1991; Haunschild 1993; Rao and Sivakumar 1999).  The 
notion of contagion mechanisms in literature on mimetic isomorphism is not strictly parallel to 
the role of communications channels in diffusion theory.  The term “communication channel” 
generally refers to the means by which a firm first becomes aware of a new innovation, whereas 
“contagion mechanism” is related to the firm’s mimicry behavior which is more closely related to 
the persuasion and decision stages of the innovation-diffusion process. 
Contagion via structural equivalence suggests that firms imitate other organizations that 
have similar relationships with their environment, even in the absence of direct contacts.  
Frequency-based imitation and outcome-based imitation are structural equivalence arguments; 
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imitation depends on potential adopters knowing about prior adopters but does not depend on 
direct contacts between the two groups.  
Anecdotal evidence, such as that in Forbes 1998 article, suggests that firms face 
significant pressure to imitate the tax savings strategies of their peers.  Therefore, I hypothesize: 
H4: The greater the number of prior COLI shelter adopters in a firm’s industry, the 
more likely a firm is to adopt the COLI shelter. 
 
 
In contrast to structural equivalence, cohesion models of imitation focus on direct 
contacts between prior adopters and potential adopters.  Several studies provide support for the 
role of social networks in the diffusion of new corporate strategies.  For example, Haunschild 
(1993) finds that managers imitate the corporate acquisition activities of other firms when they 
are linked through board interlocks.  Similarly, Rao and Sivakumar (1999) find that board 
interlocks play a role in the adoption of investor relations departments.  To the extent tax shelter 
activity is secretive; firms may not be able to observe the frequency of shelter use within their 
peer group.  Likewise, given the secrecy of tax shelters, even when a firm observes that its peers 
have lower ETRs, it may not be able to trace that outcome back to the use of a particular tax 
shelter.  Thus, a cohesion model may better explain diffusion of tax shelter use. 
Network contacts are difficult to identify and measure.  Shelter participants may be 
connected through common professional association memberships, common board members, 
common legal advisors, common tax consultants, common auditors or others.  Regulators have 
focused on the role of auditor-provided tax services in the spread of the tax shelter industry, 
criticizing that when a firm advises its audit client on a tax shelter transaction, the firm essentially 
audits its own work (U.S. Senate Permanent Subcomittee on Investigations 2005).  Because 
regulators investigating the tax shelter industry have placed a spotlight on auditors, I hypothesize: 
H5: A firm whose current auditor has audited prior COLI shelter adopters is more 
likely to adopt the COLI shelter. 
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7.2 Early Versus Late Adopter 
 
Thinking about the firm’s shelter adoption decision in the context of the diffusion of an 
innovation raises questions about the role of the firm’s social environment in the decision.  
Moreover, in the diffusion process, innovators and first adopters often differ from later adopters.  
The analysis in Part I of this study focuses on the likelihood that a firm will adopt a COLI shelter, 
but treats the first firm to adopt a COLI shelter the same as the last firm to adopt and every firm 
that adopts in between.  To better understand the spread of COLI activity, I investigate whether 
the firm characteristics hypothesized to affect the likelihood of COLI shelter adoption also affect 
the timing of COLI shelter adoption.   
Diffusion theory suggests that differences in risk propensity and the capability to generate 
and adopt innovations determine the order of innovation adoption within a group of similar firms 
(Rogers 2003).  Early adopters may have a greater need for the practice to solve a problem or 
may be embedded in a local network with norms that diverge from those held by members of the 
larger social system (Massini et al. 2005).  Behavioral theory of the firm suggests that managers 
make strategic changes when the firm’s performance falls short of aspirations (Cyert and March 
1963).  Likewise, Bromiley’s (1991) work on organizational risk taking suggests that falling short 
of benchmarks determined by the firm’s past performance and/or by the firm’s peer group 
performance increases risk taking. In Part I, I hypothesize that certain firm characteristics affect 
the firm’s decision to adopt a COLI shelter.  Here, I hypothesize that a similar set of 
characteristics also affect how quickly, relative to other firms, a firm decides to adopt a COLI 
shelter.   
H1 predicts that firms with prior indicators of aggressive financial and/or tax reporting 
behavior are more likely to adopt a COLI shelter.  These firms have a history of risk-taking 
behavior.  Diffusion theory generally suggests that innovators and early adopters have a higher 
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propensity for risk-taking.  Bromiley (1991) finds that prior risk is a positive predictor of current 
risk. In Chapter 1, I describe the development of the COLI shelter and suggest that although the 
shelter was designed to meet the letter of the law, COLI adopters knew that investing in a broad-
based COLI program was a risky tax position.  I expect early adopters to be those firms with the 
highest propensity for risk.  Therefore, I extend H1 and posit, 
H6: All else equal, firms that report aggressively for financial reporting and/or tax 
purposes will adopt the COLI shelter earlier. 
 
 
 H2 predicts that firms with fewer alternative tax savings strategies are more likely to 
adopt a COLI shelter.  Treasury (1999) suggests that competitive pressure to keep the firm’s ETR 
low and close to peer benchmarks was a major cause of the tax shelter boom.  Treasury’s 
conjecture is consistent with the idea that firms adopt new strategies and take greater risks when 
their performance falls short of benchmark goals.   Early adopters of an innovation are likely 
those firms driven by a desire to improve performance (DiMaggio and Powell 1983).  Firms look 
to riskier choices when their aspired level of performance, in this case lower ETRs, cannot be 
achieved under the status quo (Cyert and March 1963). In developing H2, I argue that firms may 
be more inclined to adopt a risky strategy, like a COLI shelter, when faced with a limited set of 
alternative tax savings strategies.  I extend that hypothesis and predict,   
H7: All else equal, firms with fewer non-COLI tax savings opportunities will adopt 
the COLI shelter earlier. 
 
 
 Not all firms eventually adopt tax shelters.  Given the economic benefits of adopting a 
COLI shelter, why do some firms reject COLI?  H3 posits that firms with greater reputational 
concerns are less likely to adopt a tax shelter.  Concern over the firm’s reputation can inhibit 
managers from adopting new strategies (Fombrun and Shanley 1990).  Later adopters look to the 
experiences of early adopters to reduce the risk and uncertainty surrounding an innovation.  Over 
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time, as more and more firms adopt an innovation, that practice gains legitimacy.  Thus, I expect 
firms with greater reputational concerns to hold back on adopting the COLI shelter, preferring to 
let others vet the strategy first.  As Gergen (2002) points out, each additional shelter adopter 
increases the risk that the government will discover the shelter and take adverse action.  From the 
shelter user’s perspective, the optimal number of users is one. The marginal risk of an additional 
adopter is problematic for early adopters, who potentially have many years worth of tax savings 
at risk, but not necessarily for the marginal firm considering adoption.  Furthermore, in 1990 
Congress failed to enact proposed legislation that would have limited COLI use.  Congress’s 
inaction could have been seen as an implicit acceptance of the COLI shelter.  Gergen (2002) goes 
so far as to say that COLI usage boomed after Congress failed to enact reform legislation.  
Overall, I expect reputational concerns to decrease a firm’s hazard rate, 
 
H8: All else equal, firms with greater reputational concerns will adopt the COLI 
shelter later.
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Chapter 8 – Research Methodology  
 
 I first test H4 and H5 using a cross-sectional model, detailed in Section 8.1.  For the 
remaining tests in Part II , I employ event history analysis, which I briefly review in Section 8.2   
Section 8.3 details tests of H4 and H5 using a discrete-time hazard model with time-varying 
explanatory variables.  I test H6, H7 and H8 using a Cox proportional hazard model, explained in 
Section 8.4, and a split-population model, outlined in Section 8.5. 
 
8.1 Cross-Sectional Analysis 
First, I test H4 and H5 using a simple cross-sectional logit model, similar to the one 
employed in Part I.  I construct two variables designed to capture the influence of the firm’s 
social environment on its decision to adopt a COLI shelter and include these variables, along with 
firm-specific characteristics in the following logistic regression model: 
Pr(COLIi,t) =   β0 + β1 D_RDi,t-1 + β2LEVERAGEi,t-1 +β3FOREIGNi,t-1 + (3) 
  β 4CAPINTi,t-1 + β5VOLi,t-1 + β6PMDACC3yri,t + β7BTD3yri,t +  
 β8ROAi,t-1 + β9lnEMPi,t-1 + β10ROAi,t-1 + β11AUDITLINKi  +  
 β12NINDUSTRYi + εi,t  
 
where the dependent variable is an indicator equal to 1 if the firm participated in a COLI shelter 
and 0 otherwise.   
In Part I, I hypothesize (H1) that firms that report aggressively for financial statement 
purposes will be more likely to adopt a tax shelter, and I include PMDACC in the model to proxy 
for aggressive financial reporting.  In Eq. (3), I expand on H1 and predict that firms with a 
tendency to report aggressively for either financial or tax reporting purposes will be more likely 
engage in shelter activity. I test whether indicators of prior aggressive corporate reporting 
increase the likelihood of adopting a COLI shelter by including a measure of prior aggressive 
financial reporting behavior, PMDACC3yr, and a measure of prior aggressive tax reporting, 
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BTD3yr.  As in Part I, I estimate performance-matched discretionary accruals (PMDACC).  I 
include the average of the absolute value of PMDACC over the prior three years (PMDACC3yr) 
in Eq. (3) and expect the coefficient on this variable to be positive. 
To capture prior aggressive tax reporting, I include BTD3yr, an estimate of the firm’s 
permanent book-tax differences averaged over the prior three years and deflated by total assets 
averaged over the prior three years.  I estimate permanent differences, PERMDIFF, following 
Frank et al. (2006) as the difference between book income and taxable income.  Book income 
equals pretax income (data 170) less minority (data 49), and taxable income equals the sum of 
current federal tax expense (data 63) and current foreign tax expense (data 64), divided by the 
statutory tax rate, less deferred taxes (data 50), deflated by the statutory tax rate.42  I expect a 
positive coefficient on BTD3yr.   
H2 posits that firms with fewer alternative shelter substitutes are more likely to adopt a 
tax shelter.  I include four variables in Eq. (3) to proxy for firms’ non-COLI tax savings 
opportunities: D_RD, LEVERAGE, FOREIGN, and CAPINT.  Graham and Tucker (2006) find 
that shelter firms have lower debt ratios.  In Section 5.3.2, I report that relative to control firms, 
COLI firms appear to have significantly lower LEVERAGE both before and after adopting the 
COLI shelter.  Therefore, I add LEVERAGE as another measure of the firm’s alternative tax 
savings strategy set.  Consistent with H2, I expect negative coefficients for RD, LEVERAGE, 
FOREIGN and CAPINT. 
H3 predicts that firms with more visibility in the capital markets should have a greater 
incentive to avoid the appearance of impropriety associated with involvement in tax shelters.  I 
 
42 When data 63 is missing, current federal tax expense is calculated as (data 16 – data 64 – data 173 – data 
50). 
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include average trading volume (VOL) as a proxy for the firm’s capital market visibility, and 
expect a negative coefficient on VOL. 
I test H4 by including the total number of prior COLI adopters within a firm’s industry 
group (NINDUSTYi,t-1).  Industries are classified according to Barth et al. (1998).43  NINDUSTRY 
varies by firm and by year but does not vary across industry.  H4 predicts that the presence of 
prior COLI adopters lends legitimacy to the tax shelter, thus I expect a positive coefficient on 
NINDUSTRY.  
I examine the impact of direct ties between prior and potential adopters via auditors by 
including AUDITLINKi,t, equal to the number of prior COLI adopters audited by firm’s auditor in 
year t.  I use COMPUSTAT data item 149 the each firm’s auditor during the year.  Consistent with 
H5, I expect a positive coefficient on AUDITLINK.  I also include ROA and lnEMP as additional 
control variables in Eq. (3). 
I estimate Eq. (3) using a matched control sample based on asset size and market-to-book 
(MTB) ratio.   The control sample includes 403 firm-year observations.  Section 9.2 discusses the 
results of estimating Eq. (3). 
 
8.2 Event History Analysis
Diffusion is a process that occurs over time, and cross-sectional analysis does not explicitly 
incorporate the influence of time on the firm’s decision-making process.  Event history analysis, 
on the other hand, explicitly models the time or duration that a firm spends in one state before 
transitioning to another state.  To examine COLI shelter adoption, I measure time to adoption, the 
time from the advent of broad-based, leveraged COLI (time zero) to the date that a firm adopts 
                                                 
43 In Part I, I use a more detailed industry classification system based on both Barth et al. (1998) and Barth 
et al. (2005).  Results are qualitatively similar using the more detailed industry groupings. 
the COLI shelter.  Let T be a positive random variable denoting adoption times where the actual 
adoption time of an individual firm is a realization of T denoted as t.  The possible values of T 
have a probability distribution with a probability density function, f(t) and a cumulative 
distribution function, F(t). Given the probability distribution of T, we can express the hazard rate 











In a duration model, the dependent variable is the hazard rate, or the probability that a firm will 
adopt a COLI shelter at time t, given that it has not previously adopted a COLI shelter.  The key 
idea is that the probability that an event occurs depends, in some way, on time. 
There are several types of event history models.  These models differ in their assumptions 
about the hazard function, the probability distribution for the time of event occurrence.  
Parametric models directly specify the shape of the hazard rate.  In other words, these types of 
models assume that time dependency takes on a certain distribution.  Alternatively, in the Cox 
proportional hazard model the particular distributional form of the duration times is left 
unspecified, the hazard for any particular firm is a fixed proportion of the hazard for any other 
firm.  Finally, a discrete-time event history model is more analogous to a parametric model.  
Duration dependency can be incorporated in a discrete-time model explicitly by including a time 
variable like year dummies or the natural log of time. 
All duration models are fundamentally concerned with the timing of events.  To assign 
duration to an event, we must choose a time origin.  The origin is the point at which all firms 
become “at risk” of experiencing an event, and duration is the length of time from the origin until 
a particular firm actually experiences the event, the length of time the firm continues to be “at 
risk”.  Court documents indicate that the COLI shelter was developed in 1985, and I identify at 
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least one firm that appears to adopt COLI in 1986.  Therefore, I assume that firms are “at-risk” if 
they have not adopted the COLI shelter and t is greater than 1985.   
 
8.3 Discrete-time Model 
Duration models can have either time-constant covariates or time-varying covariates.  
Because the variables I use to test H4 and H5, NINDUSTRY and AUDITLINK vary over time, I 
employ a duration model with time-varying covariates.  Event history analysis often utilizes 
continuous-time duration models.  However, given discrete-time data and time-varying 
covariates, a discrete-time model is useful for testing H4 and H5 (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 
1997). 
In a discrete-time model, the dependent variable is a series of binary outcomes denoting 
whether or not the event of interest has occurred at a given time.  Each firm contributes an 
observation for each year it is “at risk” of adopting a COLI shelter.  While different in form than 
duration, these binary outcomes convey the same information as duration time (Box-
Steffensmeier and Jones 1997).  Conveniently, a discrete-time duration model can be estimated 
using a familiar logit model. 
The sample construction here follows that in Part I.  I start with the same set of COLI firms.  
However, rather than including each COLI firm only once, in the year of adoption, the sample 
used in the discrete-time model described below includes yearly observations for each COLI firm 
from 1986 up to and including the year that the firm adopts COLI.  In the year of adoption, the 
dependent variable, ADOPT, is equal to one.  Prior to the year of adoption, ADOPT is equal to 
zero.  The sample also includes yearly observations, from 1986 to 1996, for firms in Control 
Group C.  For control firms, ADOPT is equal to zero in every year.  The regression sample in Part 
I can include more than one observation for each control firm, but only for different years (e.g. 
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control firm X may be included as a match for COLI firm A in 1988 and for COLI firm B in 
1992).  The regression sample used to estimate the discrete-time model below includes one 
observation for each control firm for each year, regardless of the match year.  The final sample 
used to estimate the model has 1,905 firm-year observations, comprised of 255 firm-year 
observations for 37 COLI adopters and 1,650 firm-year observations from Control Group C.   
To test H4 and H5 using an event history model, I estimate the following discrete-time 
logit: 
Pr(ADOPTi,t) = β0 + β1D_RD i,t-1 + β2LEVERAGEi,t-1 +β3FOREIGNi,t-1 + (4) 
 β4CAPTINTi,t-1 + β 5VOLi,t-1 + β6PMDACC3yri,+ β7BTD3yri +  
 β8ROAi,t-1 + β9lnEMPi,t-1 + β 10NINDUSTRYi,t + β11AUDITLINKi,t + 
 β12ln(t) + εi,t
 
where the dependent variable is an indicator equal to 1 if the firm adopts COLI during year t and 
0 otherwise.  Beyond the year of adoption, the firm is no longer included in the analysis, and 
control firms that never adopt COLI are coded as 0 in every year.  Results from Eq. (4) can be 
interpreted in terms of the hazard probability.  Section 9.3 discusses the results of estimating Eq. 
(4). 
 
8.4 Cox Proportional Hazard Model 
The discrete-time model described in Section 8.3 is a particularly useful model given that 
NINDUSTRY and AUDITLINK are time-varying covariates.  However, a discrete-time model 
requires an explicit assumption about the form of duration dependence.  Moreover, the only way 
to disentangle the effect of a covariate on the overall likelihood of adoption from the effect of that 
covariate on the time to adoption is to interact that covariate with the explicitly modeled time 
variable.  Therefore, to test H6, H7 and H8, I estimate a Cox proportional hazard model: 
hi(t) = exp(β1D_RDi + β2LEVERAGEi +β3FOREIGNi + β 4CAPINTi + (5)  
 β5VOLi + β6PMDACC3yri,+ β7BTD3yri + β8ROAi + 
 β9lnEMPi + β10ROAi) h0(t) 
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where the dependent variable is the hazard rate for firm i at time t (the probability that a firm will 
adopt a COLI shelter at time t, given that it has not previously adopted a COLI shelter.)  
The baseline hazard rate, h0(t), is left unspecified and captures all common factors 
affecting the likelihood of adopting a COLI shelter in a particular year, while the exponential 
term includes firm-specific characteristics hypothesized to affect the rate of COLI adoption.  The 
independent variables are all measured in 1985.  To estimate Eq. (5), I set the duration to 
adoption, DURi, equal to the year a firm first adopts a COLI shelter minus 1985.  The 
construction of the control sample for the event history analysis follows that for the cross-
sectional analysis, except that instead of matching COLI and control firms on asset and MTB 
ranks in year t-1, I match firms based on asset and MTB ranks in 1985.  Section 9.4 discusses the 
results of estimating Eq. (5). 
 
8.5 Split Population Model
 Standard hazard models, like the Cox proportional model in Eq. (5), assume that 
eventually every observation will experience the event in question (i.e. every firm will eventually 
adopt a COLI shelter).  This assumption makes inferences from a standard hazard model 
problematic when the observed percentage of adopters in a population is low.  To account for the 
possibility that some portion of the population will never adopt, Schmidt and Witte (1989) 
developed the “split-population” model.44  Schmidt and Witte (1989) assume there is some 
unobserved variable, Zi, indicating whether or not an individual will eventually experience an 
event.  Let: 
  Pr(Zi = 1) = δi  = δ(Xi) and, 
                                                 
44 Split population models are also known as “cure” models in the biostatistics literature, where part of the 
population is cured and thus has a failure rate of zero. 
 Pr(Zi = 0) = 1- δi = 1 – δ(Xi).   
In the observation period, there is also an observable variable, Ci, indicating whether or not an 
individual adopts during the observation period.  For adopters, we can observe (1) Ci = 1, (2) the 
time of adoption, and (3) Xi, a vector of covariates describing the individual.  For nonadopters, 
we can observe (1) Ci = 0, and (3) Xi.  For adopters, Zi is known to equal 1; for nonadopters, either 
Zi = 0 or Zi = 1 and the individual eventually adopts beyond the observation period.  Letting F( ti | 
Xi, Zi = 1) be the c.d.f. of adoption times for eventual adopters and  f ( ti | Xi,Zi = 1) be the 
corresponding p.d.f, Schmidt and Witte (1989) show that the log-likelihood function for the entire 
sample is: 




i [log δi  + log f ( ti | Xi,Zi = 1)] +  
(1- Ci) log [1- δi  + δi  (1 - F ( Ti | Xi,Zi = 1))]. (6) 
 
In other words, the nonadopter’s contribution to the likelihood reflects the fact that some will 
never adopt and some will adopt only after the observation period. 
To test H6, H7 and H8, I estimate Eq. (6) using maximum likelihood estimation, where 
Xi is a vector of the same firm-specific characteristics included in Eq. (5), δi is estimated as a logit 
model, and the p.d.f. is assumed to follow a lognormal distribution.45  Section 9.5 discusses the 
results of estimating Eq. (6).
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45 Unlike the Cox proportional hazard model which requires no assumption about the functional form of 
the baseline hazard rate, the split population model is a variant of parametric survival models.  In a 
preliminary stage, I estimate a standard parametric hazard model using a variety of common distributions 
and find that results using a lognormal specification most closely resemble the results for the Cox model in 
Table 10.  Therefore, I use a lognormal distribution to obtain estimation results for Eq. (4) in Table 11. 
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Chapter 9 – Results and Interpretation 
9.1 Descriptive Data 
Table 7 shows the distribution of COLI adoption across years.  Recall that broad-based, 
leveraged COLI was developed in 1985 and was effectively shut down by changes in the 1996 
HIPAA Act.  Column (1) shows the number of new COLI adopters for each year, and Column (2) 
shows the cumulative number of COLI adoptions at the end of each year.  More than half of the 
total COLI adoptions occur in the last three years of the sample, perhaps suggesting that firms, 
anticipating a grandfather clause to proposed changes in the tax law, rushed to initiate plans 
before Congress enacted new tax legislation. 
Column (3) shows the number of new industries represented in the COLI sample each 
year, and Column (4) shows the cumulative number of industries represented in the COLI sample 
at the end of each year.  The 44 COLI firms fall into 10 different industries.  While over half of 
new COLI adoptions occur in the last three years, those adoptions only result in the spread of 
COLI use to one new industry. Column (5) shows the number of new auditors represented in the 
COLI sample each year, and Column (6) shows the cumulative number of auditor represented in 
the COLI sample at the end of each year.  Interestingly, the first three adopters each had different 
external auditors, and by 1990, COLI use had spread to clients of all of the former Big 6 auditors 
as well as BDO Seidman. 
 
9.2 Cross Sectional Analysis Results 
Table 8 reports results for estimating the cross-sectional logit (Eq. 3).  Column (1) show 
results of estimating the model including only firm-specific characteristics.  Columns (2), (3), and 
(4) add the social factors, NINDUSTRY and AUDITLINK posited in H4 and H5.  The regression 
results indicate that all models have reasonable explanatory power with pseudo R2 values ranging 
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from 8.74 percent to 8.78 percent.46  I begin by discussing results for H1, H2, and H3 from 
Column (1).  In Part II, I operationalize H1, H2, and H3 using some alternative measures.  I 
evaluate these alternative measures by comparing the results reported in Column (1) to the results 
reported in Tables 3, 4 and 5. 
In Part I, I use the lag of performance-matched discretionary accruals to proxy for 
aggressive financial reporting and find support for H1.  However, when I use an average of 
performance-matched discretionary accruals over the prior three years to proxy for the firm’s 
tendency to report aggressively, I do not find support of H1.  H1 predicts that firms exhibiting 
prior aggressive tax or financial reporting behavior are more likely to adopt a tax shelter.  
However, the coefficients on PMDACC3yr and BTD3yr are not significant. 
Results for H2, while mixed, are consistent with the results reported in Part I.   The 
coefficient on D_RDt-1 (0.571, z=1.44) is positive, rather than negative as predicted.  The 
coefficient on CAPINTt-1 (-0.231, z=-0.26) is negative but not significant.  Consistent with H2, the 
coefficient on LEVERAGEt-1 is negative and significant (-2.591, z=-1.73).  Firms with greater 
leverage are less likely to adopt a COLI shelter, suggesting that the interest deductions generated 
by a COLI shelter are substitutes for non-COLI debt shields.  In terms of the marginal effect, 
holding D_RDt-1 =0 and all other variables at their median values, a one standard deviation 
increase in LEVERAGEt-1 is associated with a 30 percent decrease (from 13.3 percent to 9.3 
percent) in the probability that a firm will adopt a COLI shelter.  Similarly, the coefficient on 
FOREIGNt-1 is negative and significant (-4.062, z=-2.67).  Firms with greater foreign assets are 
less likely to adopt the COLI shelter, suggesting that firms with greater opportunities to avoid 
taxation by shifting income to lower-tax jurisdictions are less likely to use the COLI shelter to 
 
46 For the full model, including NINDUSTRY and AUDITLINK, the Hosmer and Lemeshow goodness-of-fit 
χ2 equals 8.58 with a p-value for the null hypothesis equal to 0.38.  Thus, the HL statistic also 
indicates that the model is reasonably well-fitted. 
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obtain tax savings. .  In terms of the marginal effect, holding D_RDt-1 =0 and all other variables at 
their median values, a one standard deviation increase in FOREIGNt-1 is associated with a 475 
percent decrease (from 15 percent to 8.2 percent) in the probability that a firm will adopt a COLI 
shelter. 
I include VOL to proxy for firm’s capital market visibility and reputational concerns.  
Results for VOL (-0.191, z=-1.88) support H3 and suggest that managers with greater reputational 
concerns are less likely to adopt a tax shelter that shareholders might find objectionable.  The 
marginal effect indicates that, holding D_RDt-1 =0 and all other variables at their median values, a 
one standard deviation increase in VOL is associated with a 45 percent decrease (from 15 percent 
to 8.2 percent) in the probability that a firm will adopt a COLI shelter. 
Results for the control variables are similar to those reported in Part I.  The coefficient on 
ROAt-1 is not significant, but the coefficient on lnEMPt-1 is positive and significant (0.301, 
z=2.10).  Even after matching on size (assets), firms with larger workforces are more likely to 
adopt the COLI shelter, reflecting the specific technology of the COLI shelter. 
H4 predicts that the likelihood that a firm adopts COLI during the year increases with the 
number of prior adopters in its industry.  H4 is based on the notion that as the number firms 
participating in the COLI shelter increases, the shelter gains legitimacy, decreasing the perceived 
risk associated with aggressive tax reporting behavior for firms that have not already adopted.  A 
positive coefficient on NINDUSTRY would imply that firms imitate their structurally equivalent 
peers’ tax sheltering activities.  However, as Table 8 shows, the coefficient on NINDUSTRY is not 
significant in either column (3) or column (4). 
Frequency and outcome-based imitation both depend on potential adopters of an 
innovation observing the behavior of prior adopters.  One explanation for the results for 
NINDUSTRY may be that secrecy prevents peer firms from mimicking the tax savings garnered 
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by COLI participants.  Another explanation is that industry does not accurately capture a firm’s 
structurally equivalent peers. 
H5 predicts that auditors impact the spread of COLI shelter adoption.  In 1998, Forbes 
ran an article on “The Hustling of X-Rated Shelters,” detailing the marketing efforts of public 
accounting firms in a booming tax shelter industry.  However, the coefficient on AUDITLINK is 
not significant in either column (2) or column (4); suggesting that prior and potential COLI 
adopters are not linked via shared auditors.  By 1990, seven different auditors had audited COLI 
adopters.  Although the results in Table 8 cannot be generalized to other tax shelters, individual or 
corporate, COLI use does not appear to have spread through the marketing efforts of any 
particular public accounting firm. 
Overall, the evidence in Table 8 suggests that COLI participation is associated with the 
presence of R&D expenditures, lower leverage, lower foreign operations and higher trading 
volume.  Taken together, the results support H2 and H3 but do not support H1, H4, and H5. 
 
9.3 Discrete-time Logit Results 
Table 9 shows the results of estimating the discrete-time logit model (Eq. 4).  The 
discrete-time model estimates the probability of adopting a COLI shelter during the year, 
conditional on not having adopted a COLI shelter in a previous year.  Column (1) provides a 
baseline and reports results including explanatory variables from Eq. (3).  Column (2) adds ln(t) 
to test for duration dependence.  Columns (3) and (4) report results when NINDUSTRY and 
AUDITLINK are added to the model, and Column (5) reports results for the full specification of 
Eq. (4).  Pseudo R2 values range from 4.54 percent to 8.78 percent.  The log-likelihoods are 
reported for each specification.  With a chi-square statistic of 16.56 (9 degrees of freedom), a 
likelihood ratio test rejects the null hypothesis that all of the coefficients other than the intercept 
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are zero.  Further, the chi-square statistic from a likelihood ratio test of duration dependence (χ2 = 
13.79 with one degree of freedom) suggests that a model that accounts for duration dependency is 
superior to one that does not.  However, likelihood ratio tests in Columns (3), (4) and (5) indicate 
that relative to the specification in Column (2), including AUDITLINK and NINDUSTRY does not 
appear to improve the model. 
Results for H1- H3 are qualitatively similar to the cross-sectional logit results presented 
in Table 8.  The coefficients on PMDACC3yr and BTD3yr are not significant.  As in Table 8, 
results for H2 in the discrete-time logit model are mixed.  The coefficients on FOREIGNt-1 are 
negative and significant (p<0.05) in every specification, supporting H2.  The coefficients on RDt-1 
are unexpectedly positive, and the coefficients on CAPINTt-1 are not significant.  Unlike Table 8, 
in Table 9 the coefficients on LEVERAGEt-1 are not significant.  Consistent with results in Table 
8, the coefficients on VOL are negative and significant (p<0.05) in every specification, providing 
additional support for H3.  Similar to Table 8, the results in Table 9 do not provide support for 
either H4 or H5. 
 
9.4 Cox Proportional Model Results 
Table 10 reports the results of estimating Eq. (5) for a sample of 40 COLI firms and 288 
control firms with the data necessary to construct the independent variables for the year 1985.  In 
addition to the traditional coefficient estimates, I report the coefficients as hazard ratios.  When 
the hazard ratio for an independent variable is greater (less) than one, a higher value of that 
variable is related to a shorter (longer) time-to-adoption.  Results reported in Table 10 are similar 
to those for the cross-sectional analysis presented in Table 8 and suggest that the firm 
characteristics associated with the decision to adopt a COLI shelter are also associated with 
 100
timing of COLI adoption.  Firms with greater leverage, foreign operations and capital market 
visibility adopt later, while R&D intensive firms and those with larger workforces adopt sooner. 
 
9.5 Split Population Model Results 
Table 11 reports the results of estimating the split-population model in Eq. (6).  I estimate 
Eq. (6) using maximum likelihood and a lognormal specification for the p.d.f. for the time taken 
to adopt.  The columns labeled, “Adoption Propensity” show the effects of the independent 
variables on the probability of eventual COLI adoption, and the columns labeled, “Duration,” 
show the effects of the same independent variables on the time to COLI adoption, given eventual 
adoption.  Note that in Table 10, the coefficients are estimates of the effect of the independent 
variables on the hazard, the probability of adopting in time t given that a firm has not yet adopted.  
The coefficients in the “Duration” column of Table 11, on the other hand, are estimates of the 
effect of the independent variables on the time to adoption.  Therefore, we should expect the signs 
on the coefficients in the two different models to be opposite.   
Results from Table 11 suggest that capital market visibility affects the decision to adopt a 
COLI shelter, but contrary to finding in Table 10, does not affect the timing of COLI adoption.  
Three variables have statistically significant effects on the mean time to adoption: FOREIGN, 
CAPINT, and lnEMP.   Consistent with the results in Table 10, the evidence in Table 11 suggests 
that firms with greater foreign operations are later adopters (4.576, z=3.02).  Although H2 
predicts that firms with greater non-COLI tax savings opportunities are less likely to adopt a 
COLI shelter, the coefficient on CAPINT in Table 11 is negative and significant.  One 
explanation for this result is that CAPINT and lnEMP are capturing a size effect, indicating that 
larger firms are earlier adopters.  Overall, the results in Table 11 indicate that (1) it is possible to 
separate out the effects of firm characteristics on the probability of eventual adoption from their 
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effects on the timing of adoption, and (2) when the number of eventual adopters is a small 
percentage of the sample, inferences from traditional hazard models may be misleading. 
 
9.6 Additional Tests 
9.6.1 Alternative Control Samples 
  H4 posits that firms mimic their structurally equivalent peers which I test by including 
NINDUSTRY, the number of prior COLI adopters in a firm’s industry, in a discrete-time logit 
model.  To avoid problems using NINDUSTRY when the control sample is matched based on 
industry, I use Control Group C to estimate Eq. (4).  In additional tests, I re-estimate Eq. (4) using 
Control Group B.  Results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar.  I also estimate Eq. (4), 
excluding NINDUSTRY, using Control Group A.  Again, results are qualitatively and 
quantitatively similar to those presented in columns 1 and 3 of Table 9.  Eq. (4) does not include 
MTBt-1 or lnASSETSt-1, as these variables are used to match COLI firms to firms in Control Group 
C.  However, inferences for H1-H5 are unchanged when MTBt-1 and lnASSETSt-1 are included.     
 
9.6.2 Time Variable 
I include ln(t) in Eq.(4) to account for duration dependence.  This specification assumes 
that the probability of adopting a shelter increases monotonically with time.  The benefit of 
including a smooth transformation of time like ln(t), relative to year dummies, is that the 
coefficient gives a parsimonious characterization of the effect of time on hazard of adopting.  
Including year dummies, on the other hand, allows for a more general characterization of the time 
dependency of the hazard, including the possibility that the dependence on time is actually quite 
lumpy.  For example, Gergen (2002) reports, “that corporations that had been considering COLI 
in early 1990 rushed to close the deal because they feared legislation but expected that existing 
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deals would be grandfathered” (p. 256).  I re-estimate Eq. (4) using year dummies, allowing for a 
more general time dependency.   Results for the firm-characteristics as well as AUDITLINK and 
NINDUSTRY are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 9.  Coefficients on the year 
dummies are all positive and are generally increasing; however, only the coefficients for 1993 
and 1994 are statistically significant.
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Chapter 10 - Summary 
Part I of this study contributes to the literature on aggressive corporate tax reporting by 
modeling firm-level characteristics that affect the likelihood a firm will engage in tax shelter 
activity.  Recent studies use book-tax differences to identify firms engaged in aggressive tax 
reporting.  However, even Treasury (1999) admits, “It is very difficult to distinguish tax shelter 
activity from other activity that results in a book/tax difference” (p. 21).  The primary advantage 
of this study over prior literature on aggressive tax reporting is that I identify a sample of known 
tax shelter participants, avoiding common problems associated with estimating tax avoidance 
using ETRs or book-tax differences.  Using a size and industry-matched control sample, I find 
that firms with higher performance-matched discretionary accruals are more likely to adopt a 
COLI shelter.  This finding is consistent with the idea that some firms have a general tendency 
toward aggressive corporate reporting that affects their reports to both shareholders and the IRS.  
I also find evidence that firms with greater reputational concerns are less likely to adopt a COLI 
shelter, suggesting that managers believe disclosure of their involvement in aggressive tax 
avoidance strategies could negatively impact the firm’s reputation. 
Part II of this study explores whether theory developed in the management literature on 
the diffusion of innovations and mimetic isomorphism can help explain the recent proliferation of 
corporate tax shelter use.  While corporate tax avoidance is not new, during the past decade 
aggressive financial reporting and aggressive tax reporting became pervasive.  This study is the 
first to empirically examine whether factors stemming from the firm’s social environment help 
explain the firm’s decision to engage in aggressive tax reporting.     
Drawing from theory on the diffusion of strategic innovations and institutional 
isomorphism, I hypothesize that as the number of prior COLI adopters increases, the shelter will 
gain legitimacy, decreasing the perceived risk associated with COLI participation and increasing 
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the likelihood that more firms will adopt COLI.  I examine whether imitation of structurally 
equivalent peers helps explain the spread of COLI participation.  However, I find that the number 
of prior adopters in a firm’s industry is not related to the likelihood that it will adopt COLI.  
These results are consistent with the secrecy surrounding the tax shelter industry and suggest that 
COLI firms may be able to sustain above-average tax savings from their participation in COLI 
because competitors are unable to mimic their strategy.  I also find no evidence that firms’ direct 
connections to prior COLI adopters via a shared auditor are related to the spread of COLI 
adoption 
Finally, this study employs event history analysis to investigate factors that affect the 
timing of COLI adoptions.  Results from a Cox proportional model suggest that the same 
characteristics associated with the decision to adopt a COLI shelter are also associated with 
timing of COLI adoption.  Firms with greater leverage, foreign operations and capital markets 
visibility adopt later, while R&D intensive firms and those with larger workforces adopt sooner.  
The Cox model assumes that all firms will eventually adopt a tax shelter, but the percentage of 
COLI adopters in my sample is quite low.  Therefore, I use a split population model to distinguish 
the factors related to the overall decision to adopt from those factors related to the timing of 
adoption.  Results from the split population model suggest that early COLI adopters are larger 




Distribution of observations across industry classifications 
 
  COLI Control Group A b Control Group B c Control Group C d




Sample # Obs. 
% of 
Sample # Obs. 
% of 
Sample # Obs. 
% of 
Sample 
Mining and construction 1000-1299, 1400-1999     3 0.75 8 2.11 
Food 2000-2111 1 2.27 2 0.48 17 4.24 15 3.95 
Textiles, printing and 
publishing  2200-2780 6 13.64 69 16.59 43 10.72 45 11.84 
Chemicals 2800-2824, 2840-2899 4 9.09 18 4.33 19 4.74 16 4.21 
Pharmaceuticals 2830-2836     7 1.75 15 3.95 
Extractive industries 2900-2999, 1300-1399 2 4.55 25 6.01 16 3.99 14 3.68 
Durable manufacturers          
Rubber, plastic, leather, 
stone, clay and glass 3000-3299 3 6.82 18 4.33 8 2.00 11 2.89 
Metal 3300-3499 4 9.09 35 8.41 18 4.49 22 5.79 
Machinery 3500-3569, 3680-3699 1 2.27 10 2.40 17 4.24 12 3.16 
Electrical equipment 3600-3669, 3680-3699 1 2.27 3 0.72 11 2.74 10 2.63 
Transportation equipment 3700-3799 4 9.09 34 8.17 17 4.24 13 3.42 
Instruments 3800-3899     14 3.49 15 3.95 
Misc. manufacturers 3900-3999     5 1.25 4 1.05 
Transportation 4000-4899 2 4.55 14 3.37 26 6.48 25 6.58 
Utilities 4900-4999 5 11.36 51 12.26 48 11.97 53 13.95 
Computers 
7370-7379, 3570-
3579, 3670-3679 3 6.82 14 3.37 24 5.99 33 8.68 
Retail          
Wholesale 5000-5199 1 2.27 12 2.88 13 3.24 14 3.68 
Misc. retail 5200-5799, 5900-5999 5 11.36 88 21.15 48 11.97 32 8.42 
Retail 5800-5899     3 0.75 4 1.05 
Services 7000-7369, 7380-8999 2 4.55 23 5.53 44 10.97 19 5.00 
Total  44  416  401  380  
 
a Industry classifications are based on Barth et al. (1998) and Barth et al. (2005) 
b Control Group A is based on a size (assets) and industry match. 
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c Control Group B is based on an asset and employee size match. 
d Control Group B is based on a size (assets) and market-to-book match. 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics of regression variables 
(COLI and control samples, year t) 
 
 COLI Sample (n=44)  Control Group A (n=416) 
Variable a Mean Q1 Median Q3  Mean Q1 Median Q3 
Total Assets ($billion) 3.663 0.444 1.102 3.643  1.656 ** 0.298 0.586 *** 1.631 
Net Sales ($billion) 4.297 0.534 1.333 3.185  1.879  0.396 0.694 ** 1.886 
PMDACC 0.009 -0.013 0.011 0.031  -0.007 ** -0.035 -0.005 ** 0.024 
D_RDt-1 0.477 0 0 1  0.293 ** 0 0 ** 1 
CAPINTt-1 0.421 0.261 0.418 0.519  0.417  0.243 0.377  0.580 
INTANGt-1 0.043 0 0 0.063  0.064 * 0 0.005  0.080 
FOREIGNt-1 0.079 0 0 0.124  0.100  0 0  0.146 
VOL 2.494 1.416 2.019 3.386  3.092 ** 1.432 2.437  3.823 
lnEMPt-1 2.493 1.496 2.211 3.303  1.944 *** 1.256 1.762 *** 2.522 
ROAt-1 0.096 0.059 0.097 0.133  0.079  0.035 0.074 * 0.115 
MTBt-1 2.315 1.490 1.909 3.084  2.273  1.287 1.816  2.656 
MTRt-1 1.773 2 2 2  1.752  2 2  2 
REL_ETR 0.028 -0.014 0.033 0.055  0.011  -0.025 0.022  0.067 
 
 Control Group B (n=401) Control Group C (n=380) 
 Mean Q1 Median Q3  Mean Q1 Median Q3 
Total Assets ($billion) 3.305  0.484 1.208  2.677  2.984  0.430 1.179  2.789 
Net Sales ($billion) 3.284  0.543 1.223  3.184  2.685  0.480 1.176  2.676 
PMDACC 0.001  -0.032 -0.000 * 0.027  -0.006 ** -0.038 -0.001 ** 0.026 
D_RDt-1 0.362  0 0 * 1  0.442  0 0  1 
CAPINTt-1 0.432  0.249 0.391  0.606  0.429  0.230 0.362  0.651 
INTANGt-1 0.055  0 0.004  0.086  0.068 * 0 0  0.903 
FOREIGNt-1 0.129 ** 0 0  0.215  0.128 ** 0 0  0.236 
VOL 3.517 *** 1.702 2.664 ** 4.054  3.657 *** 1.566 2.570 ** 4.235 
lnEMPt-1 2.374  1.459 2.160  3.190  2.160 * 1.260 1.956 ** 2.830 
ROAt-1 0.075 ** 0.035 0.074 ** 0.121  0.087  0.046 0.084  0.139 
MTBt-1 2.351  1.252 1.750  2.745  2.536  1.497 1.996  3.109 
MTRt-1 1.731  2 2  2  1.708  2 2  2 
REL_ETR 0.020  -0.025 0.024  0.074  0.027  -0.027 0.029  0.079 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level for t-test of the means, Ha: mean (coli) – mean (control) ≠ 0 and Wilcoxon rank sum test 
(medians) 
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a See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
b Control Group A is based on a size (assets) and industry match. 
c Control Group B is based on an asset and employee size match. 




Likelihood of COLI adoption 
Estimated using Control Group A 
 








Intercept  -4.437*** 11.36 -2.494 1.23 
PMDACC + 4.641** 4.28 5.010** 4.12 
D_RDt-1 - 1.240 9.92 1.498 8.70 
CAPINTt-1 - -0.652 0.27 -0.316 0.05 
INTANGt-1 - -3.144 1.59 -1.909 0.50 
FOREIGNt-1 - -2.798*** 6.40 -3.681*** 5.66 
VOL - -0.130* 2.25 -0.100 1.02 
NINST -  0.006 2.72 
ANALYST -  -0.031 0.58 
lnEMPt-1 + 0.268 1.35 0.127 0.19 
ROAt-1 + 3.252* 1.93 3.601 1.04 
MTBt-1 + -0.073 0.53 -0.141 0.98 
MTRt-1 + -0.202 0.29 -0.545 1.46 
lnASSETSt-1 + 0.342* 2.40 0.112 0.08 
REL_ETR ? 2.645 2.40 1.091 0.25 
Log-likelihood   -128.043  -86.457  
LR c  34.102***  31.452***  
Pseudo-R2  11.75%  15.39%  
Sample size   460  303  
Robust standard errors are estimated using the Huber (1967)-White(1980) procedure.   
***, **, * indicate significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively, in two-tailed tests (one-tailed 
when predicted).   
a The full sample of firm-year observations includes 44 COLI participants and 416 firm-year observations 
from Control Group A, identified using a size and industry match. The restricted sample includes 32 
COLI participants and 271 firm-year observations from Control Group A with data from I/B/E/S and 
Thompson Financial necessary to calculate ANALYST and NINST. 
b See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
c Chi-squared statistic from an LR test of the hypothesis that all coefficients other than the intercept are 
zero.  LR test for the Full Sample has 12 degrees of freedom.  LR test for the Restricted Sample has 14 




Likelihood of COLI adoption 
Estimated using Control Group B 
 








Intercept  -1.477 1.72 0.066 0.00 
PMDACC + 1.818 1.08 3.943* 2.59 
D_RDt-1 - 1.023 6.66 1.179 5.29 
CAPINTt-1 - -0.494 0.24 -0.266 0.06 
INTANGt-1 - -2.205 0.94 -0.875 0.09 
FOREIGNt-1 - -3.782*** 8.58 -4.558*** 8.35 
VOL - -0.201** 3.88 -0.155 1.56 
NINST -  0.007 4.45 
ANALYST -  -0.045 1.08 
lnEMPt-1 + 0.206 0.64 -0.032 0.01 
ROAt-1 + 4.784** 4.49 4.635** 3.76 
MTBt-1 + -0.058 0.58 -0.091 0.62 
MTRt-1 + -0.287 0.50 -0.511 1.06 
lnASSETSt-1 + -0.030 0.02 -0.187 0.29 
REL_ETR ? 0.890 0.42 -0.280 0.03 
Log-likelihood   128.963  86.953  
LR c  24.546**  23.955**  
Pseudo-R2  8.69%  12.11%  
Sample Size a  444  293  
Robust standard errors are estimated using the Huber (1967)-White(1980) procedure.   
***, **, * indicate significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively, in two-tailed tests (one-tailed 
when predicted).   
a The full sample includes 43 COLI participants and 401 firm-year observations from Control Group B, 
identified using an asset and employee size match.  The restricted sample includes 31 COLI participants 
and 265 firm-year observations from Control Group B with data from I/B/E/S and Thompson Financial 
necessary to calculate ANALYST and NINST. 
b See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
c Chi-squared statistic from an LR test of the hypothesis that all coefficients other than the intercept are 
zero.  LR test for the Full Sample has 12 degrees of freedom.  LR test for the Restricted Sample has 14 




Likelihood of COLI adoption 
Estimated using Control Group C 
 








Intercept  -1.343 1.46 -0.912 0.23 
PMDACC + 3.928** 4.00 7.526*** 7.67 
D_RDt-1 - 0.580 1.93 0.745 2.25 
CAPINTt-1 - -0.616 0.38 0.042 0.00 
INTANGt-1 - -2.963* 2.10 -1.093 0.00 
FOREIGNt-1 - -3.538*** 6.20 -3.031** 3.80 
VOL - -0.192** 3.72 -0.139 1.46 
NINST -  0.004 1.49 
ANALYST -  -0.083** 3.03 
lnEMPt-1 + 0.513** 5.02 0.568** 3.31 
ROAt-1 + 1.698 0.36 1.991 0.31 
MTBt-1 + -0.035 0.18 -0.111 0.40 
MTRt-1 + -0.004 0.00 -0.371 0.42 
lnASSETSt-1 + -0.149 0.44 -0.126 0.14 
REL_ETR ? 0.077 0.00 -1.174 0.40 
Log-likelihood   126.756  85.355  
LR c  24.572**  21.290*  
Pseudo-R2  8.84%  11.09%  
Sample Size a  423  268  
Robust standard errors are estimated using the Huber (1967)-White(1980) procedure.   
***, **, * indicate significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively, in two-tailed tests (one-tailed 
when predicted).   
a The full sample includes 43 COLI participants and 380 firm-year observations from Control Group B, 
identified using an asset and employee size match.  The restricted sample includes 31 COLI participants 
and 265 firm-year observations from Control Group B with data from I/B/E/S and Thompson Financial 
necessary to calculate ANALYST and NINST. 
b See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
c Chi-squared statistic from an LR test of the hypothesis that all coefficients other than the intercept are 





(COLI Disclosers vs. COLI Non-Disclosers, year t-1) 
Panel A: 
 Disclosers (n=31)  Non-Disclosers (n=13) 
Variable  Mean Q1 Median Q3  Mean Q1 Median Q3 
Total Assets ($billion) 1.988 0.338 0.783 2.120  6.4 * 0.869 2.755 5.652 
Net Sales ($billion) 1.823 0.414 0.953 2.168  9.105  1.179 2.949 5.786 
VOL 2.283 1.123 1.697 2.962  2.647  1.783 2.088 2.512 
ANALYST 6.774 0 5 12  15.23 ** 6 15 24 
NINST 84.500 0 60.554 132.275  208.590 * 62.277 149.356 317.559 
NBLOCK 0.860 0 1 1.4  0.4  0 0 1 
IORATIO 0.323 0 0.313 0.540  0.3  0.291 0.464 0.564 
BLOCKRATIO 0.075 0 0.051 0.135  0.0 * 0 0 0.084 
 
Panel B: 
 Disclosers (n=22)  Non-Disclosers (n=10) 
Variable  Mean Q1 Median Q3  Mean Q1 Median Q3 
Total Assets ($billion) 2.016 0.335 0.538 1.246  7.4 * 0.869 2.554 16.239 
Net Sales ($billion) 1.356 0.351 0.774 1.838  11.136  2.275 3.409 16.703 
VOL 2.586 1.495 1.979 3.032  2.824  1.672 2.255 2.671 
ANALYST 9.545 4 7 14  19.80 *** 11 21.500 25 
NINST 111.032 39.167 78.159 145.322  271.167 ** 90.200 225.183 498.44 
NBLOCK 1.206 0 1 1.857  0.6  0 0 1.400 
IORATIO 0.433 0.296 0.499 0.567  0.5  0.464 0.504 0.577 
BLOCKRATIO 0.106 0 0.081 0.175  0.0 ** 0 0 0.086 
 
 
Table 6 compares two groups within the COLI sample, firms that concurrently participate in COLI plans and disclose their use of COLI in their financial statements and 
those that do not concurrently disclose their COLI participation.  Panel A describes the full COLI sample and includes 31 Disclosers and 13 Non-Disclosers.  In Panel A, 
I set null observations equal to zero for the following variables, ANALYST, NINST, NBLOCK, IORATIO, and BLOCKRATIO.  In Panel B, I restrict the sample to firms 
with non-missing data from I/B/E/S and Thompson Financial.  Panel B includes 22 Disclosers and 10 Non-Disclosers.  See Appendix A for variable definitions.  




Distribution of COLI adopters, industries and auditors across time 



















1986 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1987 2 3 1 2 2 3 
1988 0 3 0 2 0 3 
1989 5 8 4 6 2 5 
1990 7 15 2 8 2 7 
1991 3 18 1 9 0 7 
1992 3 21 0 9 1 8 
1993 12 33 1 10 0 8 
1994 9 42 0 10 0 8 
1995 2 44 0 10 0 8 
Total 44  10  8  
 
 
Sample includes 44 COLI adopters with data to match based on market-to-book and assets and non-
missing auditor information.  Industry classifications are based on Barth, Beaver and Landsman (1998).  
Auditor is determined using data item 149 from COMPUSTAT. 
 
 
























Cross-sectional Logit Model of COLI Adoption 
Variable  
Predicted 
Sign (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept  -1.246 -1.288 -1.338 -1.348 
  (-1.59) (-1.59) (-1.60) (-1.61) 
D_RDt-1 - 0.571 0.576 0.559 0.563 
  (1.44) (1.45) (1.40) (1.41) 
LEVERAGEt-1 - -2.591** -2.616** -2.593** -2.606** 
  (-1.73) (-1.74) (-1.73) (-1.73) 
FOREIGNt-1 - -4.062*** -4.058*** -4.096*** -4.090*** 
  (-2.67) (-2.67) (-2.68) (-2.68) 
CAPINTt-1 - -0.231 -0.202 -0.182 -0.174 
  (-0.26) (-0.32) (-0.20) (-0.19) 
VOL - -0.191** -0.192** -0.189** -0.190** 
  (-1.88) (-1.89) (-1.85) (-1.86) 
PMDACC3yr + -8.444 -8.388 -8.436 -8.409 
  (-1.38) (-1.37) (-1.37) (-1.37) 
BTD3yr + -5.197 -4.991 -5.090 -5.001 
  (-0.69) (-0.66) (-0.67) (-0.66) 
ROAt-1 + 0.324 0.263 0.397 0.356 
  (0.12) (0.10) (0.15) (0.13) 
lnEMPt-1 + 0.301** 0.300** 0.308** 0.307** 
  (2.10) (2.10) (2.13) (2.12) 
AUDITLINK +  0.014  0.007 
   (0.23)  (0.11) 
NINDUSTRY +   0.019 0.017 
    (0.34) (0.28) 
Sample Size  447 447 447 447 
Pseudo-R2  8.74% 8.76% 8.78% 8.78%
 
***, **, * indicate significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively, in two-tailed tests (one-tailed 
when predicted).  The sample includes 44 COLI observations and 403 firm-year observations from a 




Discrete-time event history analysis of COLI adoption 
Variable  
Predicted 
Sign (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept  -2.315 -4.420 -4.928 -4.564 -4.949 
  (-2.87) (-4.12) (-4.12) (-4.13) (-4.11) 
D_RDt-1 - 0.640 0.769 0.805 0.865 0.833 
  (1.56) (1.83) (1.89) (1.96) (1.87) 
LEVERAGEt-1 - -1.554 -1.393 -1.235 -1.238 -1.195 
  (-0.88) (-0.77) (-0.68) (-0.68) (-0.66) 
FOREIGNt-1 - -2.826 -3.378 -3.509 -3.475 -3.530 
  (-1.93) (-2.27) (-2.32) (-2.32) (-2.33) 
CAPINTt-1 - -0.877 -0.760 -0.959 -0.880 -0.983 
  (-0.90) (-0.79) (-0.99) (-0.91) (-1.00) 
VOL - -0.292 -0.279 -0.263 -0.273 -0.262 
  (-2.18) (-2.08) (-1.98) (-2.05) (-1.97) 
PMDACC3yr + -6.447 -6.479 -6.323 -6.611 -6.366 
  (-1.17) (-1.19) (-1.17) (-1.22) (-1.17) 
BTD3yr + -6.177 -6.644 -7.242 -6.425 -7.142 
  (-0.83) (-0.93) (-1.02) (-0.90) (-1.00) 
ROAt-1 + -1.371 -0.432 0.059 -0.464 0.015 
  (-0.57) (-0.17) (0.982) (-0.18) (0.01) 
lnEMPt-1 + 0.129 0.136 0.125 0.114 0.119 
  (0.89) (0.91) (0.85) (0.76) (0.80) 
ln(t) +  1.129 1.607 1.285 1.629 
   (3.18) (2.94) (2.99) (2.90) 
AUDITLINK +   -0.145  -0.136 
    (-1.25)  (-1.08) 
NINDUSTRY +    -0.049 -0.016 
     (-0.68) (-0.20) 
Log-likelihood   -174.189 -167.295 -166.467 -167.052 -166.446 
LR a  16.56** 13.79*** 1.66 0.49 1.70 
Pseudo-R2  4.54% 8.32% 8.77% 8.45% 8.78% 
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***, **, * indicate significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively, in two-tailed tests 
(one-tailed when predicted).  The sample includes 1,905 firm-year observations from 1986 to 
1995, comprised of 37 COLI firms and 165 firms from Control Group C with non-missing 
auditor information (data 149).  See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
a Chi-squared statistic from an LR test where LR = -2(L0 – L1).  Column (1): L0 is a model where 
all coefficients other than the intercept are zero.  Column (2): L0 = Column (1).  Columns (3), (4) 










Estimate z Hazard Ratio 
RDt-1 - 0.812 2.15 2.25 
LEVERAGEt-1 - -2.978** -1.69 0.05 
FOREIGNt-1 - -4.692*** -2.56 0.01 
CAPINTt-1 - 0.463 0.45 1.59 
VOL - -0.186* -1.55 0.83 
PMDACC3yr + -2.352 -0.46 0.10 
BTD3yr + -10.005 -1.39 0.00 
ROAt-1 + 0.054 0.03 1.06 
lnEMPt-1 + 0.196* 1.28 1.22 
 
Sample Size = 328 firm observations 
LR χ2 (9 df) = -17.96, p-value = 0.03 
 
***, **, * indicate significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively, in two-tailed tests 
(one-tailed when predicted).   
 
The sample consists of 40 COLI participants and 288 control firms matched on size (assets) and 
market-to-book.  The model is estimated using the exact partial likelihood method.  The 
dependent variable is the probability of adopting a COLI shelter at time t, given that the firm had 
not previously adopted a COLI shelter, where t is the number of years since 1986.  See Appendix 



















Intercept 2.932 0.96 3.280 4.73 
RDt-1 0.220 0.17 -0.412 -0.97 
LEVERAGEt-1 4.150 0.36 3.309 1.22 
FOREIGNt-1 6.522 0.86 4.576*** 3.02 
CAPINTt-1 -3.388 -0.95 -1.463* -1.79 
VOL -0.665** -2.13 -0.154 -1.21 
PMDACC3yr 5.859 0.31 2.532 0.66 
BTD3yr -43.680 -0.91 -5.897 -0.87 
ROAt-1 6.997 1.00 2.321 1.14 
lnEMPt-1 -0.509 -1.07 -0.264** -1.95 
 
 
Sample Size = 328 firm observations 
Wald χ2 (9 df) = -21.20, p-value = 0.01 
 
***, **, * indicate significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively, in two-tailed tests 
(one-tailed when predicted).   
 
The sample consists of 40 COLI participants and 288 control firms matched on size (assets) and 
market-to-book.  The model is estimated using maximum likelihood and a lognormal 
specification for the p.d.f. for the time taken to adopt. See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
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Figure 1 
Financial Reporting for COLI 
    
 Book Book-Tax 
Adjustment 
Tax 
Increase in policy cash 
surrender value 20 (20) 0 
Death benefits 0 0 0 
Less:    Premium expense (12) 12 0 
Interest expense 
on policy loans (10) 0 (10) 
Net COLI income 
(expense) (2) (8) (10) 
 
FASB Technical Bulletin No. 85-4 prescribes the financial accounting treatment for corporate-
owned life insurance.  In a leveraged COLI transaction, net COLI income (expense) equals 
increases in the cash surrender value (interest credited to the policy) plus any death benefits 
received less the premium expense and the interest expense on the policy loans.   
 
Under IRC §72, the interest credited to the cash surrender value of the policy, in this example 
$20, is not included in the policyholder’s gross income.  In other words, returns on the firm’s 
COLI investment are income for book purposes, but excluded from income for tax purposes.  
Leveraged COLI plans were designed to be mortality neutral; the profit comes from arbitraging 
the tax-free build up of the cash surrender value, not from tax-free death benefits.  Hence, death 
benefits in this example are equal to zero.   
 
Because proceeds from life insurance receive preferential tax treatment, policy premiums are not 
deductible for tax purposes.  This example shows premium expense of $12 which reduces book 
income, but not taxable income. However, the interest expense paid on policy-backed loans, here 
$10, is tax-deductible. 
 
The numbers chosen for the example here are arbitrary, but show an important feature of the 
COLI shelter.  The transaction produces a loss for tax purposes in excess of any economic or 
financial statement loss.  Indeed, even though this example produces a $2 pre-tax book loss, at a 
35% statutory rate, the $2.80 tax benefit from $8 of net nontaxable income offsets the $2 pre-tax 
book loss, generating positive after-tax income of $0.80. 
 
Figure 2A 



















Relative to the Control firms, COLI firms have significantly lower (one-tailed t-
test with p-value < 0.05) LEVERAGE in every time period.  LEVERAGE equals 






















The difference in average ETR is not statistically significant (two-tailed t-test 
with p-value < 0.10) in any time period. ETR equals the ratio of total income tax 





Comparison of average PMDACC  















PMDACC, performance-matched discretionary accruals, are calculated following 
Kothari et al. (2005) using an industry classification following Barth et al.(1998) 
and Barth et al. (2005).  Relative to Control firms, COLI firms have significantly 
higher PMDACC in year t-4 (t-statistic = 1.99, p-value = 0.05), significantly 
lower PMDACC in year t-3 (t-statistic = -2.01, p-value = 0.05) and significantly 
higher PMDACC in year t (t-statistic = 2.76, p-value = 0.01). The mean 






 Comparison of average PERMDIFF 














PERMDIFF, permanent book-tax differences, are calculated following Frank et 
al. (2005), as the difference between book income and taxable income, deflated 
by assets at the beginning of the year (lag data 6).  Book income equals pretax 
income (data 170) less minority (data 49) and taxable income equals the sum of 
current federal tax expense (data 63) and current foreign tax expense (data 64), 
divided by the statutory tax rate, less deferred taxes, divided by the statutory tax 
rate.  When data 63 is missing, current federal tax expense is calculated as (data 
16 – data 64 – data 173 – data 50) 
 
Relative to Control firms, COLI firms have significantly higher (one-tailed t-test 
with p-value<0.10) PERMDIFF in every year except year t+1. 
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Appendix A – Variable Definitions 
  
Total Assets ($billion) Data 6 / 1,000 
Net Sales ($billion) Data 12 / 1,000 
D_RDt-1 A dichotomous variable equal to one if the firm reports positive 
research expenditures (data 46) and zero otherwise. 
LEVERAGEt-1 Ratio of total liabilities (data 9) / total assets (data 6) for the prior 
year. 
CAPINTt-1 Ratio of net property, plant and equipment (data 8) / total assets 
(data 6) for the prior year. 
FOREIGNt-1 Ratio of foreign assets / total assets for the prior year (from 
COMPUSTAT Geographic Segment file). 
VOL Ratio of volume to shares outstanding, averaged over the year. 
PMDACC3yr The absolute value of performance-matched discretionary accruals 
averaged over the prior 3 years. 
BTD3yr Permanent book-tax differences, averaged over the prior 3 years, 
divided by total assets (data 6) averaged over the prior 3 years. 
IORATIO The fraction of shares held by institutional owners averaged across 
the four quarters in the prior year 
BLOCKRATIO The fraction of shares held by five-percent blockholders averaged 
across the four quarters in the prior year. 
NINST The number of institutional owners averaged across the four 
quarters in the prior year. 
NBLOCK The number of five-percent blockholders averaged across the four 
quarters in the prior year. 
ANALYST The number of analysts included in the most recent consensus 
forecast of annual earnings on I/B/E/S. 
lnEMPt-1 Log of employees (data 29) for the prior year. 
ROAt-1 Ratio of pre-tax book income (data 170 – data 49) / average total 
assets ((data 6 + lagged data 6)/2) for the prior year. 
MTBt-1 Prior year’s market-to-book ratio ((data 199 * data 25)/ data 60) 
NINDUSTRY The cumulative number of COLI adopters in firm i’s industry from 
1986 though the end of year t-1. 
AUDITLINK The number of prior COLI adopters audited by the firm’s auditor 
in year t. 
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